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PIERCING THE VEIL: THE LIMITS OF BRAIN DEATH AS A
LEGAL FICTION
Seema K. Shah*
Brain death is different from the traditional, biological conception of death. Al-
though there is no possibility of a meaningful recovery, considerable scientific
evidence shows that neurological and other functions persist in patients accurately
diagnosed as brain dead. Elsewhere with others, I have argued that brain death
should be understood as an unacknowledged status legal fiction. A legal fiction
arises when the law treats something as true, though it is known to be false or not
known to be true, for a particular legal purpose (like the fiction that corporations
are persons). Moving towards greater transparency, it is legally and ethically justi-
fiable to use this fiction to determine when to permit treatment withdrawal and
organ transplantation.
However, persistent controversy and recent conflicts between hospitals and families
over the treatment of brain-dead patients demonstrate the need for clearer limits on
the legal fiction of brain death. This Article argues that more people should recog-
nize that brain death is a legal fiction and further contends that existing
scholarship has inadequately addressed the appropriate use of the legal fiction of
brain death in legal conflicts.
For instance, as in Jahi McMath’s case (in which a mother wanted to keep her
daughter on a ventilator after she was determined brain dead), families may dis-
trust physicians and hospitals who fail to acknowledge that brain death is a legal
fiction. Legislators in most states have ignored the need to permit statutory excep-
tions for individuals with strong sanctity of life views. When hospitals treat brain-
dead pregnant women, as in Marlise Muñoz’s case, courts have failed to weigh the
fundamental constitutional rights of pregnant women against the state’s interests.
Finally, judges and legislators should sometimes “pierce the veil” of brain death
and should not use the legal fiction in cases involving: (1) religious and moral
objections, (2) insurance reimbursement for extended care of brain-dead patients,
(3) maintenance of pregnant, brain-dead women, and (4) biomedical research. The
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Article concludes with general guidance for judges, legislators, and other legal ac-
tors to use regarding legal fictions.
INTRODUCTION
Considerable public attention has centered on two cases, in
which hospitals and family members have disagreed over the treat-
ment of brain-dead patients.1 These cases demonstrate that the
controversy over brain death cannot remain confined to scholarly
literature2 and that clearer guidance is needed regarding when
brain death should or should not be used to resolve legal
controversies.
Brain death is defined as the “irreversible cessation of all func-
tions of the entire brain.”3 Notwithstanding the tremendous value
of the legal standard of brain death in some contexts, “brain death”
is simply not the equivalent of a traditional, biological conception
of death where the heart stops beating and the body grows cold to
the touch and begins deteriorating.4 Although brain-dead patients
are in an irreversible coma and have no chance of regaining con-
sciousness or the ability to breathe spontaneously, they are not
biologically dead. Their hearts still beat with the aid of mechanical
ventilation; their bodies can heal wounds, mount stress responses,
grow feverish in response to infection, move spontaneously, and
maintain a warm body temperature; and, for many brain-dead pa-
tients, the brain continues to secrete vasopressin, a hormone that
regulates the balance of salt and fluids in the body.5
Jahi McMath’s case received national attention. Three physicians
examined Jahi, a thirteen-year-old girl, a few days after she had sur-
gery to remove her tonsils, adenoids, and uvula; these physicians
1. See generally Benedict Carey & Denise Grady, At Issue in 2 Wrenching Cases, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 9, 2014, at A1; Manny Fernandez & Erik Eckholm, Pregnant, and Forced to Stay on Life
Support, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2014, at A1; Carolyn Jones & Henry K. Lee, Brain-dead Jahi McMath
released to her family, S.F. GATE (Jan. 6, 2014), http://www.sfgate.com/health/article/Brain-
dead-Jahi-McMath-released-to-her-family-5116262.php; Jason Wells, Jahi McMath: Family of
brain dead girl keeping out of public view, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 14, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/
local/lanow/la-me-ln-jahi-mcmath-family-brain-dead-body-20140114story.html.
2. See, e.g., Michael Nair-Collins, Brain Death, Paternalism, and the Language of “Death,” 23
KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 53, 53 (2013).
3. UNIF. DETERMINATION OF DEATH ACT § 1 (1980), 12A U.L.A. 781 (2008).
4. Throughout this Article, the term “biological death” refers to the irreversible cessa-
tion of the functioning of an organism as a whole. See FRANKLIN G. MILLER & ROBERT D.
TRUOG. DEATH, DYING, AND ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION: RECONSTRUCTING MEDICAL ETHICS AT
THE END OF LIFE 69 (2012).
5. See D. Alan Shewmon, The Brain and Somatic Integration, 26 J. MED. & PHILOS. 457,
467–69 (2001).
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agreed that she was brain dead.6 The family believed that Jahi was
alive and could still recover, and asked the hospital to keep her on
the ventilator.7 The family’s lawyer expressed that the family did not
believe that Jahi had died or that the hospital should treat her as a
dead person because, with the support of mechanical ventilation,
her heart was still beating and her body remained warm to the
touch.8 The family sought to compel the hospital to perform a
tracheostomy on Jahi and insert a feeding tube to make it easier to
transfer her to a local facility; the hospital refused.9 The court ini-
tially issued a temporary restraining order against the hospital.10
The court then required an independent physician to examine Jahi
to determine whether she was brain dead, ultimately accepted the
physician’s determination of brain death, and considered Jahi le-
gally dead.11 The family eventually transferred her to a long term
care facility.12
In the second case, Marlise Muñoz, who was fourteen weeks preg-
nant, suffered from what appeared to be a pulmonary embolism,
and doctors determined she was brain dead in November 2013.13
Although her family wished to remove her from life support and
felt this was consistent with her wishes, the hospital refused. It cited
a Texas law that states that “life-sustaining treatment” cannot be
withdrawn or withheld from a pregnant woman, regardless of how
6. Jones & Lee, supra note 1.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.; Carolyn Jones, Jahi McMath’s family says hospital blocking transfer, S.F. GATE, (Dec.
31, 2013), http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/Jahi-McMath-s-family-says-hospital-block
ing-5105627.php.
10. Winkfield v. Children’s Hosp. Oakland, Case No. RG13-07598 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec.
20, 2013), (Temp. Restraining Order Following Petition for Emergency Protective/ Re-
straining Order Authorizing Medical Treatment and Authorizing Petitioner to Give Consent
to Medical Treatment.), available at http://www.thaddeuspope.com/images/
Winkfield_v._Childrens_Hosp_Oakland_Cal_2013_.pdf.
11. Lisa Fernandez, Judge Declares Oakland Teen Legally Dead, NBC BAY AREA, http://www
.nbcbayarea.com/news/local/Third-Doctor-Declares-Jahi-McMath-of-Oakland-Legally-Dead-
237179681.html.
12. Natalie Neysa Alund, Jahi McMath: Timeline of events in case of brain-dead Oakland teen,
SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, http://www.mercurynews.com/nation-world/ci_24852090/jahi-mc-
math-timeline-events-case-brain-dead-oakland; Jahi McMath arrives at long-term care facility, says
family, CBS NEWS (Jan. 6, 2014), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/jahi-mcmath-arrives-at-long-
term-care-facility/. Recent reports suggest that Jahi McMath is still maintained on a ventilator
at this long-term care facility. Kristin J. Bender, Jahi McMath still hooked to machines 1 year later,
S.F. GATE (Dec. 14, 2014), http://www.sfgate.com/news/us/article/Jahi-McMath-still-
hooked-to-machines-1-year-later-5952198.php.
13. Manny Fernandez, Texas Woman Is Taken Off Life Support After Order, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
26, 2014, at A9.
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far along the pregnancy has advanced.14 The family sued the hospi-
tal, arguing that the statute requiring hospitals to keep pregnant
patients on life support should not apply to Ms. Muñoz because
Texas law considers a person biologically dead when they are brain
dead.15 Although the court ultimately accepted this argument and
granted the family’s request,16 a strict application of the legal fic-
tion of brain death could have led to a different outcome under
even slightly varied circumstances.
Because brain death is actually a legal fiction, courts should not,
by default, extend the legal standard of brain death to the types of
cases discussed above. A legal fiction exists when the law treats
something known to be false (or not known to be true) as if it were
true for a particular legal purpose.17 Fictions are devices that sim-
plify the extension of the law. For example, although corporations
are not persons, the law treats them as such to apply statutes and
case law to their circumstances. Moreover, courts are aware that
sometimes exceptions to this legal fiction are warranted and have
“pierced the corporate veil” when the strict application of the legal
fiction would produce an unjust outcome.18 Unlike the fiction of
corporate personhood, however, the legal fiction of brain death is
not widely acknowledged, which makes it hard to recognize when
the courts use the legal fiction inappropriately. As a result, scholars,
courts, and legislators have not addressed the need to limit the le-
gal fiction of brain death. Important and valid uses of the legal
fiction of brain death exist, for example determining when to with-
draw life-sustaining therapy and allow organ donation. In contrast,
using the traditional, cardiopulmonary standard for death, instead
of the legal fiction of brain death, is important in some
circumstances.
In light of scientific evidence, the existing rationales for consid-
ering brain death as a type of biological death fail.19 Although
commentators argue that it is indisputable that brain death is
equivalent to biological death,20 asserting this as a fact and ignoring
14. Id.
15. Fernandez & Eckholm, supra note 1; Diane Jennings, Husband sues Fort Worth hospital
to remove pregnant wife from life support, DALLAS MORNING NEWS (Jan. 14, 2014), http://www
.dallasnews.com/news/metro/20140114-husband-sues-fort-worth-hospital-to-remove-preg
nant-wife-from-life-support.ece.
16. See Muñoz v. John Peter Smith Hosp., No. 096-270080-14 (Tex. 96th Dist. Ct. Jan. 24,
2014), available at http://www.thaddeuspope.com/images/MUNOZ_-_Stipulation_Facts.pdf.
17. See LON FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS 9 (1967).
18. Robert B. Thompson, Unpacking Limited Liability, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1, 3 (1994).
19. See D. Alan Shewmon, supra note 5.
20. See, e.g., Lawrence O. Gostin, Legal and Ethical Responsibilities Following Brain Death: the
McMath and Muñoz Cases, 311 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 903, 903 (2014). Gostin argues that “[t]he
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the existing controversy over brain death is problematic. For in-
stance, some argue that because brain death is the same as death,
physicians should never treat a brain-dead patient.21 Yet physicians
regularly treat brain-dead patients to keep their organs viable for
organ donation.22
Perhaps because our medical and legal discourse employs the
term “death” when it refers to “brain death” and “biological death,”
the important distinctions between these two states are overlooked.
When theorists believe the law treats brain-dead and biologically-
dead individuals identically, relevant considerations are omitted
from medical and legal discourse. The hospital’s reluctance to ac-
commodate the McMath family illustrates this point. It was not clear
whether California’s statute, requiring some brief period of accom-
modation to allow family to gather at the bedside of a brain dead
patient,23 generated any legal obligation on the hospital to respect
the family’s views and to facilitate the transfer of Jahi McMath to
another facility.
The under-acknowledged distinction between biological death
and brain death causes confused reasoning and potentially prob-
lematic outcomes. In certain legal contexts, a traditional
conception of cardiopulmonary death, rather than brain death,
aligns better with the law’s underlying goals and policy. For in-
stance, although the correct outcome was reached in Muñoz, as
argued infra, given the complexity of the issues involved and the
potentially conflicting rights and interests of the mother and fetus,
hospitals and physicians should not use the brain death standard
mechanically to justify terminating treatment. Instead, they should
weigh a woman’s constitutional rights to privacy and to consent to
treatment against the state’s interest in preserving her life and the
life of her fetus. Furthermore, judges and legislators engaged in
this balancing should take into account the diminished interests of
brain-dead individuals and recognize that states have reduced inter-
ests in preserving the lives of brain-dead individuals.
Simply stated, brain death is a useful construct in some cases. In
other cases, a traditional, cardiopulmonary standard for death is
McMath and Muñoz cases are quite distinct in that both of these individuals have been de-
clared legally dead. Once a patient has died, any conversation about the appropriate form of
medical treatment is no longer relevant. This would mean, for example, that while Jahi’s
mother could ask for ventilation for a short duration to enable her to come to terms with her
daughter’s death, the very idea of ‘treatment,’ especially if it is of an indefinite duration,
would be well beyond the bounds of prevailing ethical or legal thought.” Id.
21. See, e.g., id.
22. Pauline M. Todd et al., Organ Preservation in a Brain Dead Patient: Information Support
for Neurocritical Care Protocol Development, 95 J. MED. LIBR. ASS’N 238, 238 (2007).
23. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1254.4 (West 2008).
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more appropriate. Therefore, resolving the question of when it is
appropriate to use brain death as a legal fiction will increase trans-
parency and awareness of the fiction’s limits. The McMath and
Muñoz cases demonstrate the need for a clearer understanding of
when to use the legal fiction of brain death.
To develop this argument, Part I describes the historical develop-
ment of brain death, the current legal standards for determining
death, and the widely-accepted evidence about brain death that
caused controversy. Part II explores the theoretical basis and justifi-
cations for legal fictions and establishes a theoretical approach to
status legal fictions. This theoretical analysis demonstrates why us-
ing a legal fiction is the best solution to the controversy over brain
death. Part III argues for greater transparency surrounding the le-
gal fiction of brain death among judges, legislators, hospitals, and
members of the public. That Part addresses the appropriate use of
the legal fiction of brain death by using the cases of Jahi McMath
and Marlise Muñoz. In particular, hospitals and courts should not
use the legal fiction of brain death in cases involving: (1) religious
and moral objections, (2) insurance reimbursement for extended
care of brain-dead patients, (3) maintenance of pregnant, brain-
dead women, and (4) biomedical research. Part IV discusses the
implication of the analysis for legal actors deciding whether to cre-
ate or use legal fictions. For these actors, in some cases, it is better
not to employ legal fictions in the first place. When legal fictions
are adopted and used, the doctrine should only be applied within
appropriate limits. Finally, this Part proposes areas for future schol-
arship to explore the use of legal fictions in technological
legislation and critically evaluates the general use of legal fictions.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Historical Development of Brain Death
Death has long been associated with a body that is cold to the
touch and without breath, heartbeat, or pulse. Of course, in the
distant past, death was difficult to accurately determine. Concern
about premature burials once prompted periods of high public
anxiety about the determination of death.24 Nevertheless, for much
24. JAN BONDENSON, BURIED ALIVE: THE TERRIFYING HISTORY OF OUR MOST PRIMAL FEAR
31–32 (2002) (documenting periods with high levels of anxiety among the public about the
prospect of being buried alive, such as after cholera epidemics when the dead were buried
hastily in order to avoid the spread of disease). Some contended that bodily decay was the
only sure sign of death at the time.
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of history, laypeople and the medical profession have believed that
death occurs when breathing ceases and the heart stops beating
permanently.25 The legal view of death followed the medical one.
The fourth edition of Black’s Law Dictionary, published in 1968,
defined natural death as “[t]he cessation of life; the ceasing to exist;
defined by physicians as a total stoppage of the circulation of the
blood, and a cessation of the animal and vital functions consequent
thereon, such as respiration, pulsation, etc.”26
With the development of ventilators and other life-sustaining
technologies in the 1950s and 1960s, the implications of the tradi-
tional, cardiopulmonary view of death troubled physicians.
Ventilators could maintain patients for years at a time, even though
some of these patients seemed to have permanently lost conscious-
ness, the ability to breathe spontaneously, and the ability to interact
meaningfully with others.27 French scientists first identified this
state as “coma dépassé”28 (roughly translating to “beyond coma”).29
Physicians and scientists came to believe that this state of profound
neurological loss belonged in a category of its own. Legal, moral, or
social reasons linked this category to a legal determination of
death.30
In 1968, Henry Beecher and others from Harvard formed the
self-described Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School.
The Committee published an article intended to change how death
was determined, both legally and medically.31 The article noted that
new approaches to life-sustaining technology were placing consider-
able burdens on families and hospitals, and that people kept on
ventilators could serve as a source of valuable, high-quality organs.32
25. PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BI-
OMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DEFINING DEATH: MEDICAL, LEGAL, AND ETHICAL ISSUES
IN THE DETERMINATION OF DEATH 5 (1981) [hereinafter PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION].
26. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 488 (4th ed. 1968). See also Thomas v. Anderson, 96 Cal.
App. 2d 371, 376 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1950) (citing identical language in the third edition of
Black’s Law Dictionary).
27. MILLER & TRUOG supra note 4, at 53–54 (2012).
28. Pierre Mollaret & Maurice Goulon, Le coma dépassé [The depassed coma (preliminary
memoir)], 101 REV. NEUROL. (PARIS) 3 (1959).
29. THE PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, CONTROVERSIES IN THE DETERMINATION OF
DEATH 3 (2008).
30. Calixto Machado et al., The Concept of Brain Death Did Not Evolve to Benefit Organ Trans-
plants, 33 J. MED. ETHICS 197, 197–98 (2007). Note that although Machado and colleagues
accurately describe the evolution of the concept of brain death, scientists and physicians did
not necessarily view total brain failure as a new way of determining death at least until the
publication of the Ad Hoc Committee report, if not later. See id. at 198.
31. Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School, A Definition of Irreversible Coma:
Report of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School to Examine the Definition of Brain
Death, 252 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 677, 677–78 (1984) [hereinafter Ad Hoc Committee].
32. Id.
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Next, they proposed a new way to determine death, based on the
permanent cessation of neurological functioning.33 The Ad Hoc
Committee also noted that if physicians could agree on a new way
to determine death, they had the potential to effect profound legal
change since physicians were typically asked to determine death in
legal disputes.34 However, the Committee did not justify their belief
that the cessation of neurological activity, or “brain death,” should
be considered death.
An article published shortly after this report commented on the
need for a public dialogue about the new criteria for death and
cited data, suggesting that the public was very confused about the
notion of brain death.35 Although debate persisted, the issue was
ultimately was somewhat resolved in the early 1980s. The Presi-
dent’s Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine
and Biomedical and Behavioral Research (hereinafter, “President’s
Commission”) was convened and tasked with explaining why pa-
tients who fit the Ad Hoc Committee’s proposed neurological
criteria should be considered biologically dead.36 The President’s
Commission explained that the development of technologies to sus-
tain life “masked” that death had already occurred and argued that
death happened with the loss of integrative functioning of the or-
ganism as a whole.37 They also proposed model language for a law
that states could adopt to change the traditional way of determining
death to include neurological criteria, or, in more colloquial terms,
brain death.38
B. The Legal Standard for Determining Death
The model language proposed by the Presidential Commission
was adopted in the Uniform Determination of Death Act
(UDDA).39 Forty-four states and the District of Columbia have
adopted the UDDA.40 The Uniform Law Commission described the
UDDA’s purpose as a “minimum one” that merely “recognizes car-
diorespiratory and brain death in accordance with the criteria the
33. Id.
34. Id. at 338–39.
35. John D. Arnold et al., Public Attitudes and the Diagnosis of Death, 206 J. AM. MED. ASS’N
1949, 1953–54 (1968).
36. See PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION, supra note 25, at 1–12 (1981).
37. Id. at 33.
38. Id. at 2.
39. UNIF. DETERMINATION OF DEATH ACT § 1, 12 U.L.A. 780 (supp. 1991).
40. Eelco Wijdicks, Brain Death Worldwide, 58 NEUROLOGY 20, 21 (2002).
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medical profession universally accepts.”41 The Uniform Law Com-
mission also explained that the act purposefully left the means of
determining death unspecified to ensure that the act did not be-
come out-of-date as medical technology advanced.42 Instead, the
UDDA provides the following:
An individual who has sustained either (1) irreversible cessa-
tion of circulatory and respiratory functions, or (2) irreversible
cessation of all functions of the entire brain, including the
brain stem, is dead. A determination of death must be made in
accordance with accepted medical standards.43
Notwithstanding the widespread acceptance of the UDDA,44
some variations persist. First, states have different “acceptable medi-
cal standards” for determining death.45 The American Academy of
Neurology provides helpful general guidance for clinicians.46 The
first task for a clinician to determine whether a patient is brain
dead is to establish the coma’s cause and rule out other potentially
reversible causes (such as hypothermia and drug use).47 Then, the
clinician should perform a series of tests to detect whether any neu-
rological reflexes are still present.48 These tests include shining a
light in both eyes and detecting no change in pupil size; touching
the cornea with a piece of tissue paper, a cotton swab, or squirts of
water and seeing no eyelid movement; and confirming the inability
to breathe independently with a process that includes taking the
patient off the ventilator for several minutes.49 States’ requirements
vary as to whether the physician making the determination must
41. Uniform Law Commission, Determination of Death Act Summary, http://www
.uniformlaws.org/ActSummary.aspx?title=Determination%20of%20Death%20Act (last vis-
ited Sept. 21, 2014).
42. Id.
43. UNIF. DETERMINATION OF DEATH ACT supra note 39, at 780.
44. PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 29, at 5–6 (2008).
45. See, e.g., VA. CODE. ANN. § 54.1-2972 (2013) (requiring that two specialists in “neurol-
ogy, neurosurgery, electroencephalography, or critical care medicine” certify brain death);
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7181 (West 1982) (requiring “independent confirmation” by a
physician); FLA. STAT. § 382.009(b) (2014) (requiring that two physicians make the determi-
nation and that “[o]ne physician shall be the treating physician, and the other physician shall
be a board-eligible or board-certified neurologist, neurosurgeon, internist, pediatrician, sur-
geon, or anesthesiologist.”).
46. See generally American Academy of Neurology Guidelines for Brain Death Determination, LIFE
ALLIANCE ORGAN RECOVERY AGENCY, http://surgery.med.miami.edu/laora/clinical-opera
tions/brain-death-diagnosis (last visited Sept. 7, 2014).
47. Id. at § I.
48. Id.
49. Id.
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have specialized in neurology, how many physicians have to con-
duct these tests, and whether registered nurses may participate in
making the determination of death.50 Some states have require-
ments for the specialty of the physician performing the
examination based on the patient’s age, and some state statutes are
more detailed than others and delineate the clinical findings that
indicate brain death has occurred.51
State laws also vary with respect to whether they accommodate
religious or moral objections to brain death. Two states, New York
and New Jersey, allow for exceptions in cases where individuals have
religious views that do not accept brain death as biological death.
New Jersey’s statute first describes how death is determined in
terms that are more consistent with a legal fiction: “[A]n individual
whose circulatory and respiratory functions can be maintained
solely by artificial means, and who has sustained irreversible cessa-
tion of all functions of the entire brain, including the brain stem,
shall be declared dead.”52 The statute then indicates the appropri-
ate use of cardiopulmonary criteria for people who have religious
objections to brain death:
The death of an individual shall not be declared upon the ba-
sis of neurological criteria . . . when the licensed physician
authorized to declare death, has reason to believe, on the basis
of information in the individual’s available medical records, or
information provided by a member of the individual’s family
or any other person knowledgeable about the individual’s per-
sonal religious beliefs that such a declaration would violate the
personal religious beliefs of the individual. In these cases,
death shall be declared, and the time of death fixed, solely
upon the basis of cardio-respiratory criteria.53
New York has adopted the UDDA, but it requires hospitals to
include “a procedure for the reasonable accommodation of the in-
dividual’s religious or moral objection to the determination as
expressed by the individual, or by the next of kin or other person
closest to the individual.”54 Since 2009, California has also required
hospitals to provide a “reasonably brief period of accommodation”
50. Wijdicks, supra note 40.
51. See, e.g., N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 13:35-6A.1 et seq.
52. N.J. Declaration of Death Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. 26:6A-3 (West 1991). This language is
consistent with a legal fiction because the statute does not state that such an individual “is
dead” and merely indicates that the individual “shall be declared dead.”
53. Id. at 6A-5.
54. Determination of Death, N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 10, § 400.16(a)(2) (1987).
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that allows families or next of kin to gather at the bedside.55 Moreo-
ver, if a surrogate decision-maker or family member voices religious
or cultural concerns about brain death, the hospital must “make
reasonable efforts to accommodate those religious and cultural
practices and concerns.”56 The hospital is only required to continue
to provide cardiopulmonary support and may also consider other
patients’ needs.57 Brain death and cardiopulmonary death are now
the two legal standards for determining death in the United States
and in many international jurisdictions.58
C. Criticisms of Using Neurological Criteria to Determine Death
Some scholars, and even the members of the Harvard Ad Hoc
Committee themselves, were uneasy with the concept of brain
death from the beginning.59 D. Alan Shewmon’s work, which
emerged in the late 1990s, contained the most forceful challenge.
Shewmon demonstrated that some patients, whom doctors had ac-
curately determined to be dead under neurological criteria, could
perform functions that seemed to require a body with integrative
functioning60 and which the President’s Commission would have
called alive.61 These functions included wound healing, spontane-
ously moving, maintaining a warm body temperature (though one
was a few degrees below normal), mounting stress responses, and
fighting infections.62 Many brain-dead patients still have at least one
functioning part of the brain—the hypothalamus, which continues
to secrete vasopressin through the posterior pituitary.63 Rare cases
55. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1254.4 (West 2008).
56. Id. at (c)(2).
57. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1254.4(d) (West 2008).
58. Wijdicks, supra note 40. Internationally, there is a divide between the “whole brain
death” standard used in the U.S. and the “brainstem death” standard created in the U.K. and
also used in countries such as Canada and India. C. Pallis, ABC of Brain Stem Death. The Posi-
tion in the USA and Elsewhere, 286 BR. MED. J. 209, 209 (1983). The brainstem is the part of the
brain that connects to the spinal cord and controls many important, involuntary bodily func-
tions, such as breathing and swallowing. Some U.K. clinicians argue that this difference has
little practical significance because injury affecting only the brainstem is rare, and the clinical
examination used is “virtually identical around the world.” See, e.g., D. Gardiner et al., Interna-
tional Perspective on the Diagnosis of Death, 108 Suppl 1 BR. J. ANAESTH. i14, i19, i25 (2012).
59. Martin S. Pernick, Brain Death in a Cultural Context: The Reconstruction of Death,
1967–1981, in THE DEFINITION OF DEATH: CONTEMPORARY CONTROVERSIES 9 (Stuart J. Younner
et al. eds., 1999) (discussed at greater length in infra Part II.B).
60. Shewmon, supra note 5, at 459–69.
61. PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION, supra note 25.
62. Id.
63. See Kazunori Arita et al., The Function of the Hypothalamo-Pituitary Axis in Brain Dead
Patients, 123 ACTA NEUROCHIRURGICA 64, 66–71 (1993); see also Michael Nair-Collins et al.,
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have occurred in which pregnant brain-dead patients successfully
gestated fetuses64 and children even underwent puberty.65
This evidence undermines the view that brain death is equivalent
to biological death and the idea that integration of the body stops
with the advent of brain death. First, many brain-dead patients do
not lose all neurological function, as the UDDA and state laws ex-
plicitly require to determine brain death.66 Second, the rationales
that justify construing brain death as biological death fail. The Pres-
ident’s Commission argued that death occurs when the body’s
integrative functioning ceases;67 yet, as discussed above, integrative
functioning does not necessarily stop upon brain death. For in-
stance, it seems strange to say that brain-dead women who gestated
fetuses for months at a time, which requires extensive biological
activity across different organ systems, had lost integrative function-
ing. The fact that brain death is not equivalent to biological death is
important because it creates problems for legal standards that are
premised upon, and incorporate, a brain death standard.
One could argue that integrative functioning does not matter be-
cause brain-dead patients rely on mechanical ventilation to perform
these functions. Along those lines, the President’s Commission ar-
gued that life-sustaining technology merely serves to “mask” the
presence of death.68 However, other instances exist in which tech-
nology is necessary to preserve organ function in people, and they
are not considered anywhere close to death. Examples include indi-
viduals who rely on pacemakers to keep their hearts beating or
patients who require dialysis. Without mechanical intervention,
these patients would not be alive, yet they are not considered dead
or even terminally ill.
Scholars, including the diverse group of scholars who formed the
President’s Council on Bioethics under President George W. Bush,
almost universally accept that some neurological and integrative
Hypothalamic-Pituitary Function in Brain Death: A Review, J. INTENSIVE CARE MED. 4–5 (March 30
2014), http://jic.sagepub.com/content/early/2014/03/29/0885066614527410.abstract.
64. David J. Powner & Ira M. Bernstein, Extended Somatic Support for Pregnant Women after
Brain Death, 31 CRIT. CARE MED. 1241, 1241–42 (2003).
65. Shewmon, supra note 5, at 468.
66. D. Alan Shewmon, Brain Death or Brain Dying? 27 J. CHILD NEUROL. 4, 5 (2012). It is
an open question whether all brain dead patients maintain some form of integrative func-
tioning, or whether it is just some subset of brain dead patients who could, theoretically, be
identified if there were more accurate criteria for determining which patients are truly brain
dead. Shewmon describes his cases in a way that could be consistent with this explanation.
Yet he and others have published many cases of patients who still have some integrative and/
or neurological functioning and people who fit existing criteria for determining brain death.
See, e.g., Powner & Bernstein supra note 64, at 1241; Nair-Collins et al., supra note 63.
67. See PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION, supra notes 25, 36–38 and accompanying text.
68. PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION, supra note 25, at 5–6.
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functioning continues in some patients after an accurate diagnosis
of brain death.69 In December 2008, the President’s Council ac-
knowledged that this evidence required a reexamination of the
neurological criteria for death and of the justification for why pa-
tients who fulfill those criteria are considered dead.70
The President’s Council coined the phrase “total brain failure” to
refer to the physiological state of those patients without calling
them dead.71 The President’s Council noted that Shewmon and
others’ research left them with two options: (1) to decide that soci-
ety must abandon neurological criteria for determining death or
(2) to develop a new rationale to explain why neurological criteria
should determine death.72 A majority of the Council rejected the
first option, noting that this would require halting the life-saving
practice of organ transplantation and endeavored to develop a new
rationale for determining death.73
The Council argued that an organism is no longer alive when it
ceases to perform the “fundamental vital work of a living organ-
ism—the work of self-preservation, achieved through the
organism’s need-driven commerce with the surrounding world.”74
They explained that the following features characterize this work:
(1) “[o]penness to the world,” (2) “[t]he ability to act upon the
world” to fulfill one’s needs, and (3) a felt need that drives action to
obtain what one needs.75 The Council stated that breathing and
consciousness are the two primary ways of demonstrating that
work.76
69. See PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 29, at 40.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 12. The Council qualifies their definition of total brain failure by explaining
that it does not preclude the existence of islands of brain tissue that may be damaged but not
completely deteriorated. Additionally, some functionality is retained in the majority of pa-
tients diagnosed with “brain death”—they continue to secrete anti-diuretic hormone, a
process that the brain mediates. Id. at 37–38. Thus, there remains some, perhaps very mini-
mal, brain function in patients with total brain failure. Notably, the Council claims they are
relying on an approximation of total brain failure, which is different than the target of this
paper—treating whole brain death as biological death.
72. Notably, the Council explains elsewhere that if total brain failure cannot support a
definition of death, it would not endorse abandoning the dead donor rule and allowing
organ transplantation to proceed. Id. at 11–12. The members also explain that total brain
failure does not necessarily mean complete failure—isolated parts of the brain may still func-
tion. They claim that the relevant question, however, is the following: “Is the organism as a
whole still present?” Id. at 38.
73. Id. at 58; see also id. at 95–100 (personal statement of Alfonso Gómez-Lobo, Ph.D.,
arguing against abandoning existing criteria for death).
74. Id. at 60.
75. Id. at 61.
76. See id.
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Some have praised the Council’s report for straightforwardly ac-
knowledging evidence about brain death in scientific literature.77
Nevertheless the report did not meet the Council’s stated goals.
First, the term “total brain failure” is inaccurate; patients who are
accurately diagnosed as brain dead continue to have certain brain
functions.78 Second, the Council failed to produce a defensible ra-
tionale for sufficiency of neurological criteria for determining
death. Wound healing, fighting off infections, and stress responses
to an incision to remove organs (without anesthesia) are all reac-
tions to the environment and a way to express a need for self-
preservation.79 Thus, the Council’s rationale should consider pa-
tients with total brain failure alive, not dead.
Moreover, as Shewmon notes, the Council’s definition is over-
inclusive.80 Its rationale would consider fetuses relatively early in de-
velopment dead because they do not breathe and do not have
consciousness.81 Although there is controversy over whether a fetus
is a person,82 no one disputes that fetuses are alive. The Council
could, of course, consider fetuses early in development alive and
state that it determines fetal death differently than and discon-
nected from how it determines death for born people and for
animals. Determining death for fetuses according to different crite-
ria than other humans, however, seems implausible. Finally, the
Council’s reasoning does not hold up to scrutiny.83 Despite the
Council’s failure, a more fruitful way of thinking about brain death
exists—namely as a legal fiction.
II. A LEGAL FICTION VIEW OF BRAIN DEATH
Although two U.S. presidential bioethics boards have asserted
that brain death is not a legal fiction,84 thinking of brain death as a
77. See, e.g., D. Alan Shewmon, Brain Death: Can It Be Resuscitated?, 39 HASTINGS CENTER
REP. 18, 19–20, 23 (2009).
78. Shewmon, supra note 5, at 465; see generally Amir Halevy, Beyond Brain Death?, 26 J.
MED. & PHIL. 493 (2001).
79. See PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 29, at 56.
80. Shewmon, supra note 77, 20–21.
81. Id. at 22.
82. See, e.g., Gregory J. Roden, Unborn Children as Constitutional Persons, 25 ISSUES L. &
MED. 185 (2010).
83. Seema K. Shah & Franklin G. Miller, Can We Handle the Truth? Legal Fictions in the
Determination of Death, 36 AM. J.L. & MED. 540, 550–51 (2010) (noting that the Council recog-
nizes that a person who has permanently lost consciousness can be alive, and a person who
cannot breathe without mechanical support can be alive, but then concludes, without ex-
plaining why, that a person who lacks both of these abilities is dead).
84. PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION, supra note 25, at 31; PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS,
supra note 29, at 49–50. In the body of the report, the Council explicitly rejects the notion
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legal fiction clarifies much of the theoretical confusion surround-
ing brain death. Brain death is an unacknowledged status legal
fiction.85 The legal fiction of brain death is ethically justifiable for
the purpose of permitting patients to consent to organ transplanta-
tion, provided its continued use comes with increased public
awareness about the fiction’s existence.86 In some, but not all, cases
there are good reasons to justify using the legal fiction of brain
death, but it is important to be explicit that it is a legal fiction.
A. Defining Legal Fictions
To understand the argument about brain death as a legal fiction,
it is essential to understand the general concept of a legal fiction
and the motivations behind the creation of legal fictions. This Sub-
section will first explain and then apply those basic concepts to the
legal fiction of brain death.
A legal fiction is a somewhat counterintuitive device that relies
on falsehoods to extend the law into new areas. Legal fictions arise
when the law treats something that is false (or not known to be
true) as if it were actually true. Sir Henry Maine noted that fictions
first arose in Roman law, usually to expand the jurisdiction of a
court and to ensure that the court had authority to try certain law-
suits.87 The first legal fictions involved statements that plaintiffs
could make that defendants were not allowed to counter.88 For ex-
ample, a plaintiff could allege he was a Roman citizen, even if he
was a foreigner, in order to allow him to bring suit in a Roman
court.89
Lon Fuller built on this work and more concretely defined a legal
fiction in his canonical work on the subject. According to Fuller, a
legal fiction is “either (1) a statement propounded with a complete
or partial consciousness of its falsity, or (2) a false statement recog-
nized as having utility.”90 Although Blackstone recognized the value
that “death should be treated merely as a legal construct or as a matter of social agreement.”
Id. at 49. Meilaender argues that “[t]he Council rejects the view that the criteria for deter-
mining death should be shaped or determined by our need and desire for transplantable
organs. We should not create ‘legal fictions’ or ‘social agreements’ whose aim is less an accu-
rate determination of death than a ready supply of organs. Whatever else human beings may
be, they are living bodies, and their death is a biological reality that we need to mark as
accurately as we are able.” Id. at 103 (personal statement of Gilbert C. Meilaender).
85. Shah & Miller, supra note 83, at 559–64.
86. Id. at 569–71.
87. HENRY MAINE, ANCIENT LAW (1861).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. FULLER, supra note 17 at 9.
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of legal fictions,91 others have argued that fictions were vestigial ele-
ments of law that interfered with symmetry and orderliness.92
A threshold question is whether there exists a difference between
a “legal fiction” and a situation in which the legal definition of a
term differs from the ordinary use of it. There are at least two im-
portant differences between the standard approach to legal
definitions and the creation of a legal fiction.
First, legal fictions may involve treating something that does not
obviously fit (and perhaps would not usually be treated as if it fit)
into a particular category as if it belonged to that category.93 For
instance, it is not obvious that one should to treat a corporation the
same as a person. Even though people make up corporations, cor-
porations do not have many fundamental characteristics of
persons—they do not breathe, eat, or sleep. They do share some
features of personhood, such as the ability to commit crimes or to
be subject to civil liability. Thus, in some ways, it might make sense
for the law to treat corporations as persons and in other ways not.
Hence courts use the legal fiction of corporate personhood, along
with the ability to pierce the corporate veil, as needed to capture
this tension.
Second, legal fictions are different than other legal constructs
because the person who makes the statement and who hears it both
recognize its falsity. For instance, to obtain jurisdiction, one English
court declared that the Isle of Minorca was located within
London.94 This extended the court’s jurisdiction beyond its ap-
proved boundaries and was intended to fit Minorca into a category
in which it did not belong. By contrast, deciding that a Segway is a
“vehicle” in interpreting a statute that prohibits vehicles in a public
park does not stretch a category beyond reasonable limits and is not
easily construed as false.
Jeremy Bentham characterized legal fictions as instances in
which judges have improperly engaged in legislating,95 suggesting
91. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *43 (“These fictions of law, though at first
they may startle the defendant, he will find upon farther consideration to be highly beneficial
and useful; especially as this maxim is ever invariably observed, that no fiction shall extend to
work an injury; it’s [sic] proper operation being to prevent a mischief, or remedy an inconve-
nience, that might result from the general rule of law.”).
92. MAINE, supra note 87.
93. Shah & Miller, supra note 83 at 561–62.
94. FULLER, supra note 17. at 18 (citing JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES
OF THE LAW 34 (1st ed. 1909)).
95. JEREMY BENTHAM, A COMMENT ON THE COMMENTARIES AND A FRAGMENT OF GOVERN-
MENT 509–10 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., 1977) (1838) (describing a legal fiction as a
“willful falsehood, having for its object the stealing legislative power, by and for hands, which
could not, or durst not, openly claim it, and, but for the delusion thus produced, could not
exercise it.”).
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that he did not think that legislators could create fictions. In con-
trast, Fuller thought judges or legislators could create legal
fictions.96 Statutory legal fictions are more puzzling than judicial fic-
tions. Why would a legislator rely on a fiction when she or he could
merely define the terms of the law to cover what she or he would
like it to cover? Fuller explained that statutory legal fictions help
simplify concepts or use familiar terms to extend the law.97 He also
noted that fictions are not necessarily created with a clear sense of
their falsity and may just “imply the opinion that the author of the
statement in question was (or would have been had he seen its full
implication) aware of its inadequacy or partial untruth, although
. . . he could think of no better way of expressing the idea he had in
mind.”98 This type of situation appears especially applicable to
judges or legislators, who create legal rules in territory that is unfa-
miliar to them, such as science and medicine. If the author of a
fiction does not fully realize its fictive nature, moreover, the fiction
is more likely unacknowledged and opaque.99 Judges employ legal
fictions for a number of different reasons.100 Bright-line legal fic-
tions involve drawing a boundary that is under- and over-inclusive
to develop an easily administrated rule.101 Anticipatory fictions treat
something that will soon be true as if it were already true to avoid
causing harm.102 Aspirational fictions involve putting forth a stan-
dard that is desirable in the abstract but nearly impossible to
achieve in practice.103 A status legal fiction is an analogy in which
one entity is treated as if it has the status of a different entity to
96. See FULLER, supra note 17, at 87–92.
97. FULLER, supra note 17, at 90 (“In accordance with the notion that the legislator ‘com-
mands’ or is ‘all-powerful,’ it is often assumed that if fictions are found in legislation they are
to be construed as expository devices—mere conveniences of expression.”).
98. FULLER, supra note 17, at 8.
99. As Fuller explains: “The use of the word ‘fiction’ does not always imply that the
statement’s author positively disbelieved it. It may rather imply the opinion that the author of
the statement in question was (or would have been had he seen its full implication) aware of
its inadequacy or partial untruth, although he may have believed it in the sense that he could
think of no better way of expressing the idea he had in mind.” FULLER, supra note 17, at 8.
Additionally, it is important not to confuse legal fictions with legal realist critiques of law.
Lon Fuller was a part of the legal realist tradition. Lon L. Fuller, American Legal Realism, 82 U.
PA. L. REV. 429, 443 (1934). However, his work on legal fictions diverges from his legal realist
critiques because legal fictions are meant to be transparent devices to extend the law that
have been openly recognized for centuries and not part of a more general skepticism of rules
to challenge classical legal theory. Michael Stephen Green, Legal Realism as Theory of Law, 46
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1915, 1917 (describing legal realism as “rule-skepticism”).
100. See Peter J. Smith, New Legal Fictions, 95 GEO. L.J. 1435, 1439–41 (2006).
101. Shah & Miller, supra note 83, at 560–61.
102. Shah & Miller, supra note 83, at 563.
103. Seema K. Shah, Does Research with Children Violate the Best Interests Standard? An Empiri-
cal and Conceptual Analysis. 8 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 121, 159 (2013).
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justify applying an existing legal framework.104 Status fictions are, by
nature, analogies because the second entity is not actually an exam-
ple of the first entity. Rather, one entity is simply treated as if it
were another because the two are similar in ways that make the
analogy sensible in order to administer the law.
For example, corporations are often treated as if they were peo-
ple under the status legal fiction of corporate personhood. Because
this legal fiction makes an analogy between the needs and activities
of people and those of corporations, and many existing laws were
created to regulate “persons,” it is more convenient for administer-
ing existing laws to grant corporations the legal status of
“person.”105 Our legal system is based upon prior authority, and an-
alogical reasoning from existing legal authority is a valid and
common way of extending law.
Another example of a status legal fiction is common law mar-
riage, which some states recognize. Under the doctrine of common
law marriage, two people who have never participated in a wedding
ceremony or obtained a marriage license, but who live together and
hold themselves out to be a married couple, are considered mar-
ried under the law.106 Additionally, the doctrine of substituted
judgment arose through the use of a legal fiction in Ex Parte Whit-
bread, decided in the English Court of Chancery in 1816.107 In this
case, the Chancellor, Lord Eldon, was faced with administering a
lunatic’s estate (in English common law, a lunatic was a person who
was competent at one time but became incompetent).108 The man’s
niece petitioned for an allowance from the estate, which was be-
yond the scope of what the Court had the authority to permit.109
Presumably moved by the niece’s plight, Lord Eldon decided that
the court was constrained to benefit the lunatic and that the only
way to do that was to do what he would have wanted—even in the
absence of any evidence of his prior wishes—thereby authorizing
the court to give an allowance to his niece.110
104. Shah & Miller, supra note 83, at 561.
105. See State v. Std. Oil Co., 49 Ohio St. 137, 177 (1892) (“The general proposition that a
corporation is to be regarded as a legal entity . . . is not disputed; but that the statement is a
mere fiction, existing only in idea, is well understood . . . . It has been introduced for the
convenience of the company in making contracts, in acquiring property for corporate pur-
poses, in suing and being sued, and to preserve the limited liability of the stockholders, by
distinguishing between the corporate debts and property of the company, and of the stock-
holders in their capacity as individuals.”).
106. Peter Nicolas, Common Law Same-Sex Marriage, 43 CONN. L. REV. 931, 933–34 (2010)
(noting the legal impossibility of divorce from common law marriage).
107. Louise Harmon, Falling Off the Vine, 100 YALE L.J. 1, 19 (1990).
108. Id. at 21.
109. Id. at 19.
110. Id. at 22.
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One final example (perhaps one closer to the focus of this Arti-
cle) is the legal fiction of “civil death.” Black’s Law Dictionary
defines “civil death” as “the loss of rights—such as the rights to vote,
make contracts, inherit, and sue.”111 Civil death was a legal device
that allowed property to pass on to the heirs of people who became
monks or those who renounced their right to remain a member of
society by committing a serious crime.112 The idea behind civil
death was to treat someone who was clearly alive “as though he were
naturally dead.”113
Regarding the limits of status fictions, remember all analogies
have limitations. Consider the use of legal precedent: lawyers repre-
senting clients rarely have a case that directly replicates the facts of
a case that is binding precedent. Instead, the lawyer must argue
from analogy, deciding which features of a case are relevant. The
critical work involved in adjudicating legal disputes in common law
legal systems is to determine which cases have features that are
good analogies to the case at hand and which do not. If a case is not
favorable to the client’s interest, the lawyer may argue that the facts
of the previous case are so different from the case at hand that the
court should disregard it. No case will settle all future cases with the
underlying subject matter, just as no analogy is ever perfect.
Thus, anyone using a legal fiction that relies on an analogy
should note its limitations. The Supreme Court’s decision in Citi-
zens United possibly led to considerable controversy because people
disagreed about the correct limits of the legal fiction of corporate
personhood.114 The majority opinion found that the law could not
ban political speech merely because the speaker is a corporation,
thereby clarifying that freedom of speech extends to corpora-
tions.115 Other Justices thought that the court should not extend
the legal fiction so far;116 the treatment of a corporation as a person
for civil liability purposes does not required treating it as such with
regards to free speech law. If there were a clear way to determine
111. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, 484 (10th ed. 2014).
112. Id.
113. Id. Note that there is also a common law fiction of “presumptive death,” that is,
declaring a person dead after he or she has been missing for seven years. Although this is
possibly a type of bright-line fiction, where most people who have been missing for seven
years are likely dead, it lends credence to the notion that death poses special definition
problems for the law.
114. Floyd Abrams, Alan B. Morrison & Ronald K. L. Collins, Transcript: Debate on Citizens
United v. Federal Election Commission, 76 ALB. L. REV. 757, 759 (2012–2013) (“Not since the flag
desecration cases of the late 1980s and early 1990s and the proposed constitutional amend-
ments following them, have we seen anything in the First Amendment area quite as divisive as
the Court’s 2010 campaign finance ruling.”).
115. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 319 (2010).
116. Id. at 466 (Stevens, J., Ginsberg, J., Breyer, J., Sotoymayor, J., dissenting).
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the correct limits of a legal fiction, the issue would be easier to set-
tle (or, more cynically, the fiction would be harder to manipulate).
B. Why Brain Death is an Unacknowledged, Status Legal Fiction
The historical development of brain death reveals that it was not
based on the discovery of a new form of biological death but rather
was a pragmatic solution to several different problems. When
Henry Beecher and the Harvard Ad Hoc Committee first proposed
the concept of brain death, they did so to resolve two important
practical problems for the field of medicine: the waste of resources
spent on people who will not recover consciousness and the need to
have organs for transplantation.117 Robert Veatch, a graduate stu-
dent at Harvard at the time of the Ad Hoc Committee’s
deliberations, worked closely with several Committee members.118
He argued that they did not believe that brain death was the
equivalent of biological death.119 As Veatch explained:
[T]he committee members implicitly held that, even though
these people are not dead in the traditional biological sense,
they have lost the moral status of members of the human
moral community. They believed that people with dead brains
should no longer be protected by norms prohibiting
homicide.120
In a 1968 article, Henry Beecher asked a question that seems to
confirm Veatch’s view:
In failing (so far) to accept irretrievable coma as a true indica-
tion of death, society condones the discard of the tissues and
organs of the hopelessly unconscious patient when they could
be used to restore the otherwise hopelessly ill but still salvage-
able individual. Can society afford such waste?121
One scholar has noted that Beecher was concerned about the
ethics of human experimentation122 and that he thought that using
117. Ad Hoc Committee, supra note 31, at 677.
118. Robert M. Veatch, Abandon the Dead Donor Rule or Change the Definition of Death? 14
KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 261, 267 (2004).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Henry K. Beecher, Ethical Problems Created by the Hopelessly Unconscious Patient, 278 N.
ENG. J. MED. 1425, 1425 (1968).
122. Pernick, supra note 59, at 3, 10 (citing Henry K. Beecher, Ethical Problems Created by
the Hopelessly Unconscious Patient, 278 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1425, 1430 (1968)).
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brain-dead individuals as human research subjects might avoid
these ethical concerns.123 This suggests that Beecher’s intention in
setting up the Harvard Ad Hoc Committee was not to ensure that
the law recognized a form of death it had previously neglected but
rather to address important practical concerns.124
Alex Capron, the future head of the Bioethics Commission that
issued the canonical report Defining Death, was an early commenta-
tor on the legal problems associated with brain death and organ
transplantation.125 Capron addressed the concern that, without stat-
utes recognizing brain death, transplant surgeons were possibly
liable for homicide.126 As a solution, he proposed that the law
should recognize that “a patient may be declared dead on the basis
of a permanent and irreversible cessation of spontaneous activity in
his brain.”127 The practical focus of Capron and other influential
figures, who worked to change how physicians determined death,
demonstrates that they were concerned about the usefulness of
neurological criteria for death and not necessarily about whether
these criteria tracked a newly discovered biological truth about the
nature of death.
Early doubts about the adequacy of brain death as a concept also
existed. In Beecher’s correspondence and writings, he expressed
uncertainty over whether to think of “hopelessly unconscious” pa-
tients as dead.128 For instance, he argued that “[a]lthough some
have attempted to make a case for the concept of a corpse as one
who is unconscious and suffering from incurable brain damage,
one can nevertheless orient the situation swiftly by a single wry
question: ‘Would you bury such a man whose heart was beating?’”129
Yet Beecher also “shifted back and forth between endorsing and
rejecting consciousness as the conceptual foundation of his diag-
nostic criteria,”130 betraying uncertainty about the basis for
determining that brain death was a form of death.
In addition to Beecher’s doubts about brain death, prominent
scholars presented early critiques of brain death.131 In 1982, Mark
123. Id. at 10.
124. Id.




128. Beecher, supra note 121.
129. Id. at 1426.
130. Pernick, supra note 59, at 12.
131. See Hans Jonas, Against the Stream: Comments on the Definition and Redefinition of Death,
in PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS 132, 138 (1974) (“We do not know with certainty the borderline
between life and death, and a definition cannot substitute for knowledge. Moreover, we have
322 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 48:2
Siegler and Dan Wikler responded to cases involving pregnant,
brain-dead women by stating, “It has been known for some time
that brain-dead patients, suitably maintained, can breathe, circulate
blood, digest food, filter wastes, maintain body temperature, gener-
ate new tissue, and fulfill other functions as well.”132 Siegler and
Wikler raised some of the same concerns mentioned in the Muñoz
case, discussed infra, and concluded that: “The death of the brain
seems not to serve as a boundary; it is a tragic, ultimately fatal loss,
but not death itself. Bodily death occurs later, when integrated
functioning ceases.”133 They also suggested that, though brain
death might be an appropriate legal or moral construction, it was
not a valid biological or medical one.134 Both considering brain
death the same as biological death and the largely pragmatic rea-
sons for developing the concept suggest that under Fuller’s
definition, brain death was a legal fiction. It was “propounded with
. . . partial consciousness of its falsity”135 and was justified from the
beginning by its utility.
The historical development of brain death suggests that it is a
status legal fiction, which relies upon an analogy between brain
death and the traditional view of death. The analogy is as follows:
like cardiopulmonary death, brain death does considerable damage
to the brain and causes an irreversible loss of consciousness. Some-
one who is brain dead, like a corpse, has lost consciousness and the
ability to interact in any meaningful way with others and the outside
world.
However, this analogy is limited. Unlike people who are dead ac-
cording to cardiopulmonary criteria, brain-dead patients’ bodies do
not grow cold, retain the ability to heal wounds, and can, in some
cases, gestate babies successfully.136 Thus, the best way to under-
stand brain death is as a status legal fiction. It is therefore
appropriate to treat brain death as death in some respects, while
also recognizing its limits.
sufficient grounds for suspecting that the artificially supported condition of the comatose
patient may still be one of life, however reduced—i.e., for doubting that, even with the brain
function gone, he is completely dead. In this state of marginal ignorance and doubt the only
course to take is to lean over backward toward the side of possible life.”). Jonas also raises
concerns that the desire for organs for transplantation motivated the Ad Hoc Committee’s
redefinition of death and that the same logic would permit using brain dead individuals as
organ banks, blood banks, and subjects in troubling experiments. Id. at 133, 137.
132. Mark Siegler & Daniel Wikler, Brain Death and Live Birth, 248 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1101,
1101 (1982).
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1102.
135. FULLER, supra note 17, at 9.
136. PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 29, at 40.
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An alternative view is that brain death is not a fiction but a way of
legally adopting a personhood view of death. The idea is that once
consciousness and higher brain function are permanently lost, the
person is gone and death has occurred. Bob Veatch’s recollection
of his interactions with the Ad Hoc Committee suggests this view,137
and some scholars have argued for a personhood view of death.138
One problem is that there is no clear indication that this is what
motivated the adoption of brain death initially. In fact, both the
President’s Council and President’s Commission expressly rejected
a personhood standard of death.139 Additionally, people who are in
a persistent vegetative state seem to have permanently lost con-
sciousness but are clearly not brain dead.140 The legal and medical
fields do not currently treat people with those disorders of con-
sciousness as dead.
Additionally, no jurisdiction uses a personhood standard of
death,141 and a shift to that standard would necessitate dramatic le-
gal change. What counts as a person is already hotly contested.
Given the controversy surrounding definitions of personhood, it is
hard to imagine that a democratic process would adopt a per-
sonhood standard of death. Thus, a personhood standard of death
is not the correct way to characterize the legal standard of brain
death and is unlikely to provide much legal utility.
Different kinds of legal fictions exist. Several authors have ac-
knowledged that brain death may be a legal fiction but have
contended that it is a bright-line fiction or a fiction that draws a
sharp line between two states when there is not a clear boundary
between them.142 For instance, Alta Charo has argued that defining
death requires bright-line fictions because of the difficulty involved
in determining precisely when death occurs.143 Others argue that
brain death is an “important social construction.”144 They further
contend that, given that dying is a process, “the decision reached by
the medical and particularly the neurology community to articulate
137. See Veatch, supra note 118, at 267–68.
138. See, e.g., id. at 268–69; John P. Lizza, Defining Death for Persons and Human Organisms,
20 THEORETICAL MED. & BIOETHICS 439, 439 (1999).
139. PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION, supra note 25, at 40–41; PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON
BIOETHICS, supra note 29, at 50–52.
140. See Stephen Holland, et al., Death, Treatment Decisions, and the Permanent Vegetative
State: Evidence from Families and Experts, MED. HEALTH CARE & PHIL., 413, 414 n. 5 (2014).
141. PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 29.
142. Shah & Miller, supra note 83, at 560.
143. Alta R. Charo, Dusk, Dawn, and Defining Death: Legal Classifications and Biological Cate-
gories, in THE DEFINITION OF DEATH: CONTEMPORARY CONTROVERSIES 277, 277 (Stuart
Youngner et al. eds., 1999).
144. David C. Magnus, Benjamin S. Wilfond & Arthur L. Caplan. Accepting Brain Death,
NEW ENG. J. MED. 891, 893 (2014).
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and promulgate the concept of brain death as the right place to
draw the line between life and death is extremely reasonable.”145
However, a bright-line fiction does not accurately describe the
legal fiction of brain death. In a standard bright-line fiction, the law
uses a bright line to demarcate a boundary that does not really exist
to make it easier for judges or other legal actors to administer and
apply the fiction.146 The legal rule will be both over- and under-
inclusive. For instance, in many jurisdictions eighteen is the age
when individuals are considered adults who are capable of consent.
This bright line neglects the fact that some children under the age
of eighteen are already mature and that some adults over the age of
eighteen never quite reach maturity. Bright lines make rules that
are easy to apply but that may reach undesirable or incorrect results
in certain cases.
Even if bright lines create boundaries where none really exist,
they are valuable and necessary in many cases and are likely to be
wrong mainly at the margins. Some amount of error may make it
easier and less costly to administer rules. Courts should not adopt
bright-line fictions if the bright lines do not, by and large, obtain
the right results. For instance, imagine if there were scientific evi-
dence that ninety-nine percent of all eighteen- and nineteen-year-
olds lack the capacity to make decisions because a crucial develop-
mental step does not occur until the age of twenty. In that case,
courts should reconsider the rule. Similarly, a rule that only thirty-
five-year olds had full decision-making autonomy would get the re-
sult wrong too often to count as a reasonable bright line.
By contrast, a classic legal fiction is understood as false most of
the time without undermining the reasons for initially adopting the
fiction. A strict bright-line rule concerning neurological death is
unproductive as two states have exceptions to accommodate relig-
ious views that do not accept brain death.147 Moreover, the evidence
shows that many people who are accurately diagnosed as brain dead
retain some brain function and various types of integrative func-
tioning.148 This suggests that the fiction of brain death is simply
false much of the time, not just at the margins.
Status legal fictions are usually transparent. For instance, corpo-
rations are not human beings, and no one would mistake civil death
145. Id. at 893.
146. Shah & Miller, supra note 83, at 561.
147. Robert S. Olick, Eli A. Braun & Joel Potash, Accommodating Religious and Moral Objec-
tions to Neurological Death, 20 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 183, 183 (2009) (discussing how New York
and New Jersey reasonably accommodate a patient’s religious or moral objection to deter-
mining death on the basis of neurological criteria).
148. See, e.g., supra Part I.C.
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for biological death. Yet, brain death is only partially transparent. It
is also a confusing subject for the public when physicians and schol-
ars routinely argue that brain death is the same as death. Thus,
whole brain death is an especially dangerous type of legal fiction
since it is opaque, unacknowledged, and therefore vulnerable to
misuse.149 Given the dangers associated with using this legal fiction,
an important question to ask is whether it does more harm than
good. If this legal fiction is not ethically justifiable on balance, the
law should eliminate it.
C. Is the Legal Fiction of Brain Death Justifiable?
Even given the costs of developing unwieldy or partially dishon-
est extensions of the law, scholars have argued that legal fictions are
permissible.150 The legal fiction of brain death exists to respond to
practical problems generated by the introduction of new life-sus-
taining technologies.151 These technologies have likely saved many
lives and have made it possible to maintain patients beyond the
point of recovering consciousness or interacting meaningfully with
the world.
Providing legal recognition of brain death as death had several
benefits. First, hospitals and families became empowered to with-
draw treatment from brain-dead patients.152 This permitted families
to fully grieve and move on. It allowed families to honor the wishes
of patients, who did not want to be maintained on life support in-
definitely with no chance of returning to a relatively well-
functioning life. Hospitals could also distribute scarce resources in
intensive care units to patients who had a chance to restore signifi-
cant function. Legal recognition of brain death, therefore,
prevented the continued use of limited resources for people who
would never have a meaningful recovery.
149. See Shah & Miller, supra note 83.
150. Blackstone contended that a fiction could be worthwhile as long as it does not “ex-
tend to work an injury; it’s [sic] proper operation being to prevent a mischief.” BLACKSTONE,
supra note 91.
151. See Ad Hoc Committee, supra note 31, at 677–79.
152. See M. Smith, Brain Death, 108 BR. J. ANAESTH i6, i6 (2012) (explaining that “the
confirmation of brain death allows the withdrawal of therapies that can no longer conceiva-
bly benefit an individual who has died.”). Of course, once the Supreme Court recognized the
right to refuse consent to life-sustaining therapy, the legal fiction of brain death was no
longer strictly necessary for individuals or families to decide to withdraw care, but it is still
necessary to allow hospitals to make the decision to withdraw brain-dead patients from life-
sustaining therapy when a family objects. See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S.
261, 270 (1990).
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Second, treating brain death as biological death contributed sig-
nificantly to organ transplantation.153 Brain-dead donors are ideal
sources of organs. Their organs continue to receive blood flow and
oxygen from hearts that still beat, unlike the organs donated from
cadavers. Thus, patients who meet neurological criteria for death
are “the preferred source of organs” compared to individuals deter-
mined dead based on cardiopulmonary criteria. 154
Yet the “dead donor rule”—the still-existing ethical and legal
constraint that holds that doctors cannot remove vital organs neces-
sary to keep bodies alive from patients until they are dead—stood
in the way.155 The view that opposes procuring vital organs until the
donor is dead is widely held. Surgeons who transplant organs from
patients are possibly culpable of homicide unless their patients were
legally dead before the operation.156 Gary Greenberg noted “[b]y
the nineteen-sixties, as doctors began to perfect techniques for
transplanting livers and hearts, the medical establishment faced a
paradox: the need for both a living body and a dead donor.”157
There is a tremendous need for organ transplantation even today,
and over 120,000 people are currently on waiting lists for organ
donation.158 Treating brain death as legal death made it possible to
save many lives through organ transplantation without physicians
having to violate the dead donor rule and suffer drastic legal
consequences.
Is saving lives through organ transplantation sufficient to justify
using brain death as a legal fiction? Is the justification for the legal
fiction a purely utilitarian argument that neglects important ethical
constraints? The dead donor constraint is both a legal and ethical
constraint. Frank Miller and Bob Truog have argued that the cur-
rent practice of organ donation, premised on using brain death as a
legal fiction, is ethically justifiable.159 A patient must be in a state of
irreversible coma to be declared dead under neurological criteria,
153. See Shah & Miller, supra note 83, at 569.
154. PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 29, at 8.
155. MILLER & TRUOG, supra note 4 at 113. The dead donor rule is not an express legal
prohibition but a long-standing and cross-cutting prohibition that is found in many places. As
such, determining the limits of the dead donor rule are difficult, especially in order to deter-
mine whether it contemplates the use of a legal fiction to determine death. As this Article
argues below, however, there is good reason to extend the legal fiction of brain death to
apply to the dead donor rule.
156. John Robertson, Should We Scrap the Dead Donor Rule?, 14 AM. J. BIOETHICS 52, 52
(2014).
157. Gary Greenberg, As Good as Dead, THE NEW YORKER, Aug. 13, 2001.
158. Data Reports, ORGAN PROCUREMENT & TRANSPLANTATION NETWORK, http://optn.trans
plant.hrsa.gov/data/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2014).
159. Franklin G. Miller & Robert D. Truog, Rethinking the Ethics of Vital Organ Donations,
38 HASTINGS CTR. REPORT 38, 39–40 (2008).
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which is characterized by the permanent loss of consciousness.160
Although brain-dead patients can do many things that seem consis-
tent with life and may persist for years on ventilators after being
determined brain dead, they have permanently lost the ability to
connect or interact with others in a meaningful way. Brain-dead pa-
tients cannot communicate with their loved ones, leave their
hospital beds under their own volition, express desires or wishes,
make decisions, or interact with others in any meaningful way.
Though there are many published reports of brain-dead patients
persisting on ventilators for many years, healing wounds, maintain
warm body temperatures, and gestating babies, no single case exists
of a brain-dead patient recovering consciousness or the ability to
interact with others.161
Miller and Truog, therefore, argue that brain-dead patients can
be considered “as good as dead” for the purpose of deciding when
to withdraw life-sustaining therapy and permit the procurement of
organs. Because brain-dead patients have permanently lost con-
sciousness and their ability to interact with the world in a
meaningful way, as long as they or their surrogates give informed
consent to withdraw therapy and donate their organs, they have not
been harmed or wronged.162 After a determination of brain death,
it is therefore ethically justifiable to allow patients to decide pro-
spectively to serve as organ donors (through an organ donor card
or an advance directive) or to allow their families to permit the
procurement of organs from brain-dead patients. Miller and Truog
also find it justifiable for hospitals to stop providing therapy for
160. Id. at 39.
161. For an overview of the evidence on outcomes related to brain dead patients and the
preservation of integrative functioning, see PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note
29, at 40. Of course, the development of future technology could possibly change this. See,
e.g., Norimitsu Onishi, A Brain Is Dead, a Heart Beats On, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2014, at A10. Some
would also argue that society may simply lack the evidence to know for certain whether some
brain dead patients can recover, given that brain dead individuals typically are not main-
tained on life support for long periods of time since it is difficult to defend the extensive use
of resources required to do so. See Ronald Cranford, Even the Dead Are Not Terminally Ill Any-
more, 51 NEUROLOGY 6, 1531 (1998) (“It is impossible to know with certainty the extent of
prolonged survival in brain death because a systematic clinical study in which the cardiac and
circulatory functions are sustained for prolonged periods (weeks, months, or years) in a large
number of patients is morally indefensible, extraordinarily expensive in terms of money and
resources of manpower and intensive care unit beds, and legally prohibitive.”).
162. Miller & Truog, supra note 155, at 145–46. But see Nair-Collins, supra note 2, at 56
(“By contrast, theorists such as Paul Byrne, Michael Potts, and several others are in agree-
ment with Miller and Truog that brain death is not death and organ removal kills the donor.
However, these authors . . . accept the dead donor rule, and thus object to the removal of
nonpaired vital organs from brain death patients, since such patients are, on this view,
alive.”).
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brain-dead patients though they leave open the possibility that hos-
pitals should reasonably accommodate the views of individuals who
do not accept brain death.163
The legal fiction of brain death has previously under-recognized
costs. The McMath and Muñoz cases discussed above demonstrate
that treating brain death as legal death can lead to confusing and
undesirable outcomes in a number of legal scenarios in which a
brain death standard is not appropriate. The next Part explores
whether creating limits on the legal fiction of brain death can man-
age these costs.
III. WHEN TO SUSPEND THE LEGAL FICTION OF BRAIN DEATH
Even with the significant benefits this legal fiction offers, cases
illustrate times when the legal fiction of brain death is unhelpful or
counterproductive. Just as “piercing the corporate veil” occasionally
suspends the legal fiction of corporate personhood,164 hospitals and
doctors should sometimes decline to use the legal fiction of brain
death and treat brain-dead individuals as alive instead.
One potential objection to this line of argument is that sus-
pending the legal fiction of brain death in some, but not all,
instances might lead to more confusion and might undermine the
fiction’s utility. If legal fictions extend the law quickly and seam-
lessly into a new domain, then recognizing limits to a legal fiction
will undermine that goal. Therefore, if limits to a legal fiction are
needed, perhaps the law should abandon the fiction and transpar-
ently decide issues on a case-by-case basis.
This objection has some merit, and the legal fiction of brain
death is clearly not ideal. Maintaining this legal “scaffolding” has
some costs. Yet, since charges of death panels garner public atten-
tion and concern,165 states will likely keep the dead donor rule. In
163. See Miller & Truog, supra note 155, at 45. Michael Nair-Collins recently raised an
important caveat to this view while looking at the evidence about how consent for organ
donation is obtained. He found several examples of inaccurate, if not deceptive, information
about brain death given to individuals prior to asking for their consent. He rightly questions
the validity of the consent currently obtained from individuals or family members, if this
consent is given in reliance on misleading information. If brain death was transformed into a
transparent, acknowledged legal fiction, hospitals would need to change the current prac-
tices of obtaining informed consent for organ transplantation and withdrawal of therapy
from brain dead patients. Id. at 81–87.
164. Thompson, supra note 18, at 3, 9.
165. E.g., Ben Cosman, Death Panels Will Be Sarah Palin’s Greatest Legacy, THE WIRE (May
30, 2014), http://www.thewire.com/politics/2014/05/death-panels-will-be-sarah-palins-
greatest-legacy/371888/ (discussing the continued media prominence of the phrase “death
panels,” which was coined by Sarah Palin in reference to aspects of the Affordable Care Act).
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this context, the legal fiction of brain death should become more
transparent to ensure that it is accurately applied.
In some respects, recognizing limits to the legal fiction of brain
death is nothing new. Doctors already treat brain-dead individuals
differently than biologically-dead people. For instance, brain-dead
patients are not immediately disconnected from ventilators to dis-
pose of their remains. Physicians typically give families time to say
goodbye and have qualms about burying a body still warm to the
touch. The U.S. military has kept brain-dead service members on
ventilators in order to give family members time to say goodbye.166
In one published case, a hospital accommodated the wishes of fam-
ily members, who wanted to keep a brain-dead patient on a
ventilator to try an alternative medicine remedy.167 Cases like these
demonstrate that the practice of suspending the legal fiction of
brain death in some cases is fairly well-accepted, even if it is not
fully recognized. Regardless, the commentary on the McMath and
Muñoz cases does not fully acknowledge that brain death is a legal
fiction168 and therefore exposes the public to confusing and poten-
tially misleading interpretations of these cases.
In sum, the McMath and Muñoz cases illustrate why it is important
to avoid using the legal fiction of brain death with respect to: (1)
legal accommodations for religious and moral objections to brain
death, (2) insurance reimbursement for care of brain-dead pa-
tients, and (3) the balancing of constitutional rights and interests of
pregnant women who are brain dead. This Part will also briefly
touch on other situations in which doctors should recognize brain-
dead individuals as alive and should treat accordingly.
A. The McMath Case: Religious and Moral Objections to Brain Death
In the McMath case, Jahi McMath became brain dead after com-
plications from a surgical procedure.169 Given that the family did
not expect this outcome, they may have lost trust in the physicians
166. See Gregg Zoroya, U.S. Troops’ Organ Donations Save European Lives, U.S.A. TODAY,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/military/story/2012-05-03/militaryorgandonations/547331
32/1 (May 4, 2012).
167. Arthur Isak Applbaum et al., A Family’s Request for Complementary Medicine After Patient
Brain Death, 299 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2188 (2008). In this case, the physicians kept the patient
on the ventilator for a few days to accommodate the family and allow for another family
member to arrive.
168. See, e.g., Gostin, supra note 20; Magnus et al., supra note 144.
169. Lisa Fernandez, Judge Orders Hospital to Keep Jahi McMath on Life Support, NBC BAY
AREA, http://www.nbcbayarea.com/news/local/Judge-Orders-Oakland-Hospital-to-Keep-
Jahi-McMath-on-Life-Support-236808851.html.
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and hospital staff and found it difficult to believe the doctors con-
cerning brain death. The family may also have distrusted the
physicians because they did not acknowledge that brain death is a
legal fiction. Members of the lay public may find brain death hard
to understand when they are told that their family members are
dead but can see their loved one breathe, maintain warmth, and
grow a beard, regardless of his dependence on a ventilator.170 Hav-
ing a physician state unequivocally that someone who is brain dead
is dead, despite displaying visible signs associated with life, is incred-
ibly hard to believe. For those who already lack trust in their
physicians, the claims are possibly even harder to believe. In the
McMath case, the family did not appear to believe that Jahi McMath
had permanently lost her ability to interact with the world in a
meaningful way.171
The McMath family might have had reasons to seek continued
care for Jahi. First, if the family had strong views that all life is sa-
cred and was willing to pay or obtain financing for Jahi’s care to
keep her alive, their deeply held beliefs might have motivated their
decision. For example, some segments of Orthodox Judaism and
Japanese society reject a neurological determination of death, and
there have been reports of some Roman Catholic and Islamic relig-
ious leaders also rejecting brain death.172
Accommodating these views is important. First, robust demo-
cratic deliberations did not decide to treat brain-dead patients as
biologically dead. As discussed in Subsection II.B, hospitals adopted
neurological criteria for death based on the urging of the Harvard
Ad Hoc Committee and the blessing of the President’s Commis-
sion. Neither organization transparently acknowledged doubts
about brain death that existed at the time. If making sense of brain
death relies on the idea that after certain brain functions perma-
nently cease the person is gone forever, then this view is not strictly
biological. It requires a broader sense of what a person is, which is a
170. G. Marmisa and J.L. Escalante, Organ Donation Interviews in Community of Madrid,
Spain, 34 TRANSPLANT. PROC. 23 (2002) (twelve out of 758 families refused to donate organs
based on disbelief in the concept of brain death); see also Maryse Pelletier, The Organ Donor
Family Members’ Perception of Stressful Situations During the Organ Donation Experience, 17 J. ADV.
NURS. 90, 93 (1992) (in a small qualitative study of seven family members of deceased pa-
tients, found that two participants found brain death difficult to reconcile with death when
their family members’ bodies were still warm and perspiring, and their beards were still grow-
ing, and one participant stated that her husband’s “heart was pumping away when he was
pronounced dead. He appeared alive yet he [the physician] had just told me he was dead.
How could I believe he was dead?”).
171. Fernandez, supra note 169 (quoting Jahi McMath’s mother’s written plea to the
court: “She is alive. I believe in God and that He can heal all. God created Jahi. He can save
her.”).
172. Olick, supra note 147, at 186.
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contested notion for which there is no universal consensus. Relig-
ious accommodations have an important place in many different
legal domains.173 Given the relatively shaky democratic foundations
of the legal fiction of brain death, accommodating opposing views
about death seems especially warranted.
Second, biology suggests that brain death is not a valid concep-
tion of death. The evidence about brain death suggests that
although it may be “as good as dead” for some purposes, significant
differences exist between brain death and a traditional, biological
conception of death. If patients and families have very deeply held
religious or moral views about the sanctity of life, it is reasonable for
them to reject equating brain death and biological death. By con-
trast, consider a case involving people with religious beliefs that
rejected a cardiopulmonary definition of death and believed, even
after a body turns cold and stiff and begins to decay, religious inter-
vention could bring a person back to life. There is little reason to
accommodate religious or moral views that lack any biological plau-
sibility. Furthermore, practical reasons support the medical
profession or the law declining to accommodate such views. Hospi-
tals should not keep corpses, which are taking the place of other
patients, for days. The law’s concerns about the orderly distribution
of assets and timely administration of criminal sanctions against
people who have committed homicide support a sunset period.
The treating physicians and the hospital administration in the
McMath case had to weigh the family’s claims for respect and ac-
commodation against need to efficiently allocate scarce resources.
Although the law should not force hospitals to provide the same
care for patients who are not likely to meaningfully recover as care
for patients with a better chance at recovery, they should acknowl-
edge and respect patients and family members’ deeply held views,
and facilitate transferring patients to capable facilities.
Currently, only two states require hospitals to accommodate pa-
tients and family members who have strong religious views about
the sanctity of life that would impel them not to take brain-dead
patients off ventilators.174 Particularly given that brain death is not
the same as a traditional, biological death, the law should respect
173. See, e.g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1964) (defining “relig-
ion” as aspects of religious belief that an employer can reasonably accommodate in the
workplace); Timothy J. Aspinwall, Religious Exemption to Childhood Immunization Statutes: Reach-
ing for a More Optimal Balance between Religious Freedom and Public Health, 29 LOY. U. CHI. L.J.
109, 109 (1997-1998) (noting that forty-eight states have religious exemptions to the require-
ment to receive certain vaccinations before enrollment in public schools).
174. Olick et al., supra note 147, at 183.
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these deeply held beliefs. Additionally, the two states that allow ex-
ceptions to the neurological determination of death have not had
significant trouble administering their laws.175 Thus, an important
legal reform is for all states to require reasonable accommodation
of religious and moral beliefs that brain death is not death.
One published case of accommodation raised questions about
how long to provide care, who pays for that care, and whether
health professionals could conscientiously object to participating in
the continued care of a brain-dead patient.176 Hospitals have to bal-
ance scarce resources and other patients’ needs against any
accommodation for brain-dead patients, especially since end of life
care is very costly.177 Hospitals can place some limits on the care
they provide to accommodate families through providing care for
brain-dead patients for days at a time, caring for brain-dead patients
outside the Intensive Care Unit (ICU), minimizing the interven-
tions used to those that are necessary to ensure cardiac function
continues, and reserving the right to withdraw all interventions if
other patients are in greater need.178 Some reasonable limits on
treatment make sense to give the family time to see if a transfer to a
different facility is possible and in the period before such a transfer.
Considerable disagreement may surround the proper limits of care,
but everyone can likely agree on one example. Consider the some-
what far-fetched case of a family requesting that a brain-dead
patient be placed on a waiting list to receive a donated organ. It is
hard to imagine that anyone would think that equal consideration
be given to the brain-dead patient as a person who is conscious,
able to breathe on his or her own, and who can interact with others
in meaningful ways.
Only New Jersey requires that insurance companies pay for care
provided to brain-dead patients during the time of accommoda-
tion.179 In one case, the patient was not immediately declared brain
dead because the spouse initially did not want the doctors to per-
form neurological tests in order to have the insurance company pay
for the care as it would for any other patient.180 Likely, the delay in
determining brain death led to increased costs of care.181 Hospitals
175. Id. Note that California also has a statute that requires “a reasonably brief period of
accommodation.” See Thaddeus Mason Pope, Legal Briefing: Brain Death and Total Brain Fail-
ure, J. CLINICAL ETHICS 245, 247–48 (2014).
176. Olick et al., supra note 147, at 189.
177. See Paul E. Marik, The Cost of Inappropriate Care at the End of Life, AM. J. HOSP. PALLIAT.
CARE 2 (2014).
178. Olick et al., supra note 147, at 188.
179. Id. at 198.
180. Id. at 189.
181. Id.
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can pay for some of the care out of their charity budgets.182 Many
other worthy uses of a hospital’s charity funds exist, including pro-
viding care for people who are likely to recovery and cannot afford
to pay. A policy that requires funding the care of brain dead pa-
tients also has the potential to exhaust the hospital’s charity funds.
Should health insurance cover the care provided to accommodate
religious and moral objections to brain death? This accommoda-
tion is possibly very expensive care. When brain-dead patients are
maintained on ventilators for organ procurement, the organ pro-
curement agency pays for the care since the care is for the benefit
of the organ recipient.183 Thus, it may make sense to have the ac-
commodated individual pay for the care. Individuals should be able
to purchase insurance that will cover this possibility. This would al-
low people to buy policies or additions to policies to accommodate
their deeply held views and provide reimbursement for care pro-
vided to brain-dead patients.184
B. The Muñoz Case: Constitutional Rights of Brain-Dead Patients
The Muñoz case raises a more complex set of issues. The court
deciding the case applied the statutory definition of death to deter-
mine that the statute requiring keeping pregnant patients on life
support did not apply to Ms. Muñoz.185 This turned out appropri-
ately but slightly different facts could have led to disturbing results.
Deciding whether to continue life-sustaining therapy for a preg-
nant, brain-dead woman is one area to suspend the legal fiction of
brain death because failing to do so obscures that important consti-
tutional rights and fundamental interests are at stake.
Scholars and legal actors involved in creating the legal fiction of
brain death did not anticipate that cases involving pregnant, brain-
dead women were likely to arise. The legal fiction was created to
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. The existence of organizations such as the Terri Schiavo Foundation (www.terris
fight.org) suggests that sufficient demand may exist for an insurance market to provide care
for brain dead patients.
185. Muñoz v. John Peter Smith Hospital, No. 096-270080-14, Judgment (96th Dist. Jan.
24, 2014) (holding that: “1. The provisions of § 166.049 of the Texas HEALTH AND SAFETY
CODE do not apply to Marise Muñoz because, applying the standards used in determining
death set forth in § 671.011 of the Texas HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE, Mrs. Muñoz is dead. 2. In
light of that ruling, the Court makes no rulings on the Plaintiff’s constitutional challenges to
§ 166.049.”).
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save lives through organ donation and to ease the burdens on hos-
pitals and families.186 By contrast, when a pregnant woman becomes
brain dead, the question of maintaining her on life support has a
direct impact upon the fetus she is gestating.
 Muñoz is also important because this situation may recur. Texas
lawmakers are considering modifying the law to address future
cases, but lawmakers on different sides of the aisle have contrasting
inclinations about the statute’s application to pregnant women.187
Prior to 2009, twenty-two published reports of maintaining preg-
nant brain-dead women to save their fetuses were found, and all but
two of these resulted in the fetus being born alive.188 Another case
has since arisen in Canada, but in that case the brain-dead woman’s
physicians and partner agreed to continue treatment.189 The child
was born after twenty-eight weeks gestation and appears healthy.190
Previous cases of pregnant women becoming brain dead have
sparked controversy, with some commentators expressing strong
views about the need to preserve the life of the fetus at all costs191
and others raising concerns about the pregnant woman’s dignity.192
Additionally, one scholar argued that in jurisdictions that accept
brain death, a brain-dead pregnant woman “could be viewed as a
newly deceased, still-respiring cadaver being used as an incubator
for her fetus.”193 Veatch contends under those circumstances, the
“relevant legal and ethical literature is now clear that the use of a
newly dead, respiring cadaver should be governed by the provisions
186. See Ad Hoc Committee, supra note 31, at 677.
187. See Lauren Zakalik, Muñoz case could bring changes to Texas Health Code, WFAA.COM
(Jan. 27, 2014), http://www.wfaa.com/news/health/Muñoz-case-spurs-legislative-interest-in-
end-of-life-cases-242305371.html.
188. Anita J. Catlin & Deborah Volat, When the Fetus Is Alive but the Mother Is Not, 21 CRIT.
CARE NURS. CLIN. N. AM. 267, 268 (2009). The authors found that some fetuses had been
maintained from as early as fifteen weeks’ gestation. Additionally, one pregnant woman
stayed on life support for as long as 107 days. See id. at 269.
189. Braindead woman gives birth to healthy baby then passes away, MAIL ONLINE, http://www
.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2556485/Braindead-woman-Robyn-Benson-gives-birth-healthy-
baby-taken-life-support-day.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2014).
190. Id.
191. See, e.g., Christoph Anstötz, Should a Brain-Dead Pregnant Woman Carry Her Child to Full
Term?, 7 BIOETHICS 340, 341–42 (1993) (quoting the assistant medical director at the univer-
sity hospital as saying “on the grounds of proportionality . . . it is probably reasonable to
impose on the mother, through the use of her body, for the benefit of the child . . . ” and “we
don’t see any ethical reason simply to let the embryo die.”).
192. See, e.g., id. at 344 (quoting Hanna Wolf, a governmental spokeswoman for Women’s
Affairs, as saying the following: “What is happening in the clinic is a scandal and inhuman.
The mother is degraded to a nutrient fluid, disposable after use” and raising concerns about
whether keeping the pregnant woman on the ventilator violated the provision of the German
constitution protecting human dignity).
193. Robert Veatch, Maternal Brain Death: An Ethicist’s Thoughts, 248 JAMA 1102, 1103
(2004).
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of the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA).”194 He states that to
use this woman’s body to support her fetus, the UAGA would re-
quire either that the woman had prospectively consented to be an
organ donor or that her next of kin give proxy consent to use her
organs.195 This is the kind of convoluted reasoning the legal fiction
of brain death requires, and it seems unhelpful for resolving cases
like these. Simply in terms of who will be affected by the decision,
consent to organ donation is very different from consent to con-
tinue to treat a pregnant, brain-dead body. It is also unclear how to
apply the UAGA to cases involving brain-dead, pregnant woman—is
the fetus the “gift”, the recipient of the donation, or both?196 The
intent behind organ donation is also very different than a pregnant
woman’s decision about her fetus. A pregnant, brain-dead woman
might have wanted to save others’ lives as an organ donor but not
to continue a particular pregnancy after brain death. On the other
hand, some women may have qualms about organ donation but
would want to save their fetus at any cost.
Some courts have suggested that pregnant, brain-dead women
may have diminished or extinguished constitutional rights. In one
case, the hospital withdrew treatment once court-appointed physi-
cians determined that a pregnant woman was brain dead, even over
her common-law husband’s objections, without trying to determine
her prior wishes.197 Another case involved a brain-dead pregnant
woman on a ventilator, who was at twenty weeks gestation when her
husband sought to have her taken off the ventilator.198 Her hus-
band was not her child’s father, however, and the biological father
sought an order to maintain her on life support.199 The woman’s
prior wishes were not discussed, and the court might not have
known them.200 That case held that the woman should be main-
tained on life support but also that the mother’s right of privacy was
extinguished when she was declared brain dead.201
In analyzing cases involving pregnant, brain-dead women, the
first question that arises is whether the rights of brain-dead individ-
uals are extinguished when they are determined brain dead. This
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. See Daniel Sperling, Maternal Brain Death, 30 AM. J.L. & MED. 453, 470 (2004).
197. See, e.g., Docs say mom, fetus dead; Finding ends fight over life support, SAN ANTONIO EX-
PRESS-NEWS, Aug. 14, 1999, at 8B. In that case, a neonatologist found no evidence of a fetal
heartbeat.
198. Univ. Health Servs., Inc. v. Piazzi, Hadden, & Div. Fam. & Child. Serv., No. CV86-
RCCV-464, slip. op. at 1–2 (Ga. Super. Ct. of Richmond Cnty. Aug. 4, 1986).
199. Id. at 3.
200. See id. at 2–3.
201. Id. at 4–6.
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conclusion seems flawed because courts have recognized that even
people who are biologically dead have constitutional rights worthy
of legal protection.202 Kirsten Smolensky noted that courts have rec-
ognized that celebrities’ right of publicity can survive their deaths203
and have protected the right to reproductive autonomy after death
in cases involving the use of frozen sperm or embryos.204 The Su-
preme Court has recognized that attorney-client privilege extends
after death.205 Since both living and dead persons’ constitutional
rights are legally protected, whether someone is brain dead should
not determine whether his or her constitutional rights deserve re-
spect. However, given that brain-dead people will never regain
consciousness, sufficient ethical justification may support a legal
recognition that their interests have diminished value if they will
not thereby be harmed or wronged.206
Smolensky addressed maternal brain death cases, briefly noting
that some states will invalidate an advance directive that expresses a
woman’s preference to terminate life support after brain death.
Smolensky suggested two possible reasons: either the harm of re-
maining on mechanical ventilation after death is diminished if one
is already dead, or states simply do not like that the fetus may die
along with the woman.207 This second possibility is problematic,
particularly if it impinges on a woman’s valid constitutional rights.
But it is less clear how to determine the degree of harm done by
violating brain-dead patients’ autonomous wishes and fundamental
rights.
Muñoz raises one of the most fundamental rights at stake in cases
of brain-dead pregnant women—the right to withdraw therapy.
The Supreme Court recognized a fundamental right to withdraw
life-sustaining therapy in Cruzan case in 1990, stating that “[t]he
logical corollary of the doctrine of informed consent is that the pa-
tient generally possesses the right not to consent, that is, to refuse
treatment.”208 The Court decided that states can require a height-
ened evidentiary standard for withdrawal of therapy because of the
decision’s irreversible nature, the potential for abuse by family
202. Kirsten Rabe Smolensky, Rights of the Dead, 37 HOFSTRA LAW REV. 763, 771–72
(2008).
203. See id. at 771.
204. See id. at 784–86.
205. Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 410 (1998).
206. Miller & Truog, supra note 155, at 41.
207. See Smolensky, supra note 202, at 786–88.
208. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 270 (1990).
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members, and the state’s interest in preserving life.209 Cruzan found
that the state’s interest in preserving life even applied to patients
who had very little quality of life, as Nancy Cruzan was in a persis-
tent vegetative state and likely had permanently lost consciousness
and significant cognitive function.210 Although courts have not di-
rectly addressed the issue, Cruzan suggests that the state still has an
interest in preserving the lives of brain-dead patients. Applying
Cruzan to cases involving pregnant, brain-dead woman complicates
the issue since the state has an additional interest in preserving the
life of the fetus.211
Primarily, cases addressing the right to have an abortion have
discussed the balance between a woman’s autonomy and the state’s
interest in preserving the life of a fetus. In Roe v. Wade, the Supreme
Court recognized that women have a right to have an abortion
before the fetus is viable; however, after viability, the state can re-
strict abortions with certain exceptions permitting abortion to save
the life or health of the mother.212
The subsequent case of Planned Parenthood v. Casey challenged
Roe v. Wade.213 Recognizing the importance of stare decisis, the Su-
preme Court upheld that the state’s interest in the fetus exists
“from the outset” of pregnancy, but changed the focus from the
trimester of pregnancy to the question of fetal viability.214 Casey per-
mitted the government to place restrictions on abortions before
viability, provided that those restrictions do not unduly burden the
woman’s right to have an abortion, and allowed more restrictions
post-viability.215 When a fetus is viable depends on the available
technology, and fetuses are viable at earlier gestational ages now
than at the time of Roe and Casey.216 Taken together, Cruzan, Roe,
and Casey suggest that, in cases involving a brain-dead pregnant
209. Id. at 282 (holding that “we think a State may properly decline to make judgments
about the ‘quality’ of life that a particular individual may enjoy, and simply assert an unquali-
fied interest in the preservation of human life to be weighed against the constitutionally
protected interests of the individual.”).
210. Id. at 266.
211. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973).
212. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 163–64; see also Linda J. Wharton and Kathryn Kolbert, Preserving
Roe v. Wade . . . When You Win Only Half the Loaf, 24 STANF. L. & POL’Y REV. 143, 151 (2013).
Viability of a fetus “means having reached such a stage of development as to be capable of
living, under normal conditions, outside the uterus.” As of 2012, one article reported that
fetuses in the U.S. are typically viable after twenty-four weeks. G.H. Breborowicz, Limits of fetal
viability and its enhancement, 5 EARLY PREGNANCY 49, 49 (2001).
213. Casey, 505 U.S. at 833.
214. Id. at 846.
215. See Wharton & Kolbert, supra note 212, at 151.
216. See Breborowicz, supra note 212, at 49.
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woman, courts should balance the woman’s autonomy interests
against the state’s interest in preserving her life and the life of her
fetus. Some commentators have argued that this would cause the
following schema: (1) pre-viability, a brain-dead pregnant woman’s
views should be respected, and (2) post-viability, the state’s interest
in preserving the life of the fetus should trump any interest a brain-
dead pregnant woman might have had in terminating treatment.217
Surprisingly, however, the legal distinction between killing and
letting someone die may make the abortion jurisprudence inappli-
cable in cases that involve removing pregnant women from
ventilators. Although a strong ethical reason justifies rejecting this
distinction,218 courts have relied upon it to recognize a fundamen-
tal right to withdraw therapy but to deny a fundamental right to
physician-assisted suicide or euthanasia.219 In Vacco v. Quill, the Su-
preme Court held that a rational reason supported states’ decisions
to regulate the withdrawal of therapy and physician assisted suicide
differently. The Court held that “when a patient refuses life-sus-
taining medical treatment, he dies from an underlying fatal disease
or pathology; but if a patient ingests lethal medication prescribed
by a physician, he is killed by that medication.”220 The Court also
argued that these two situations were critically different—a physi-
cian who withdraws therapy intends to respect the patient’s wishes
and stops providing unnecessary treatment, but a physician who as-
sists a patient in committing suicide (or who euthanizes a patient)
has the primary intent of ending the patient’s life.221 Thus, with-
drawing therapy from a pregnant, brain-dead patient merely results
in the death of the fetus, but was not intended to do so and is not
the direct cause of the death. This suggests that abortion case law
would not apply to cases of withdrawing therapy from a brain-dead
pregnant woman, and that the only fundamental constitutional
right at stake is the woman’s right to refuse therapy. Nevertheless,
the fact that there are strong ethical arguments against maintaining
this legal distinction may place decision-makers in a bind. In partic-
ular, judges who are inclined to apply the abortion case law may
struggle to reconcile their ethical and legal duties.
Courts have balanced the right to refuse therapy against the
state’s interest in preserving the life of a fetus in cases involving
pregnant women who are Jehovah’s witnesses and refuse to consent
217. Alexis Gregorian, Post-Mortem Pregnancy, 19 ANN. HEALTH L. 401, 424 (2010).
218. See J. Rachels, Active and Passive Euthanasia, 292 N. ENGL. J. MED. 78 (1975).
219. Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 800–01 (1997).
220. Id. at 801.
221. Id.
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to life-saving blood transfusions based on their religious beliefs. In
two cases, courts have ordered blood transfusions to preserve the
life of a fetus, even though in one case, the fetus was not yet via-
ble.222 In another case, the court found the decision was very
difficult but ultimately held that “the State may not override a preg-
nant woman’s competent treatment decision, including refusal of
recommended invasive medical procedures, to potentially save the
life of the viable fetus.”223 These cases suggest that a considerable
tension exists between a pregnant woman’s right to refuse treat-
ment and the state’s interest in preserving the life of her fetus. They
also demonstrate that courts have previously overridden a woman’s
autonomy interests in refusing treatment.
Returning to the Muñoz case, the family was clear that they and
Marlise Muñoz wished to terminate life support.224 Requiring her to
remain on a ventilator against her wishes for weeks on end was a
tremendous burden on her constitutional right to withdraw ther-
apy. Does that right still apply to a brain-dead patient who has
permanently lost consciousness? There is no reason to think that it
would not. The Supreme Court first recognized a fundamental
right to withdraw therapy when the individual involved, Nancy
Cruzan, was in a persistent vegetative state.225 Ms. Cruzan had some
brain stem function and could breathe without mechanical sup-
port, but she had permanently lost consciousness.226 This suggests
that the right to consent or withhold consent from intervention is,
at most, slightly diminished for a brain-dead patient. The state’s in-
terest in preserving Ms. Muñoz’s life was also diminished but not
extinguished.
222. See In re Jamaica Hosp., 128 Misc. 2d 1006, 1008 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985) (recognizing
that “[i]n this case, the State has a highly significant interest in protecting the life of a mid-
term fetus, which outweighs the patient’s right to refuse a blood transfusion on religious
grounds.”); Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Mem’l Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 423 (1964)
(directing the trial court to undertake the following actions: “(1) to appoint a special guard-
ian for the infant; (2) to substitute such guardian as party plaintiff; (3) to order the guardian
to consent to such blood transfusions as may be required and seek such other relief as may be
necessary to preserve the lives of the mother and the child; and (4) to direct the mother to
submit to such blood transfusions and to restrain the defendant husband from interfering
therewith.”).
223. In re Brown, 294 Ill. App. 3d 159, 171 (1997).
224. Complaint at 3–4, Muñoz v. John Peter Smith Hospital, No. 096-270080-14 (Tex.
96th Dist. Ct. Jan. 24, 2014), available at http://www.thaddeuspope.com/images/Munoz_v._
JPS_Jan_2014_.pdf.
225. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 270 (1990).
226. Id. at 266–67 n.1.
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The hospital and the state should have discontinued Ms.
Muñoz’s treatment because the fetus was developing abnormally.227
If the fetus was not going to be born alive, that fact negates any
interest the state had in preserving the fetus’ life. All of these fac-
tors suggest that the hospital and the state should not have kept Ms.
Muñoz on life support contrary to her and her family’s wishes. In
Muñoz, then, the legal fiction of brain death led to the same result
as a more complex analysis of constitutional rights. But circum-
stances exist in which the applying the legal fiction of brain death
produces a questionable outcome.
Consider a case in which family members of a pregnant, brain-
dead patient have evidence that the patient would have wanted to
maintain the pregnancy. When family members’ interests and the
state’s interest in preserving the fetus’ life align, hospitals and fam-
ily members may agree to continue to treat a brain-dead, pregnant
woman in the hopes that her fetus will remain viable. In those cases,
it is hard to imagine why anyone would invoke the legal fiction of
brain death.
In other cases, different conflicts could arise. If a pregnant
woman were very close to term and became brain dead, but no evi-
dence existed regarding her wishes for the fetus, should she remain
on life support? What if the pregnant woman had felt ambivalent
about the fetus or had not wanted a child? Likely at some point—
not necessarily the point of viability, but some point after the fetus
becomes viable—the state’s interest in preserving the fetus’ life
trumps a woman’s constitutional right to withdraw therapy. As the
pregnancy advances, the woman’s interest in withdrawing therapy
might be insufficient to overcome the state’s interest. The state’s
interest in preserving fetal life increases depending on the fetus’
condition, how far along the pregnancy is, and evidence that the
fetus is will survive after birth. Treating brain death as a legal fiction
avoids these difficult questions by suggesting that the pregnant
woman should be treated as if she were biologically dead and re-
moved from the ventilator.
Finally, ethical questions also arise when brain-dead pregnant
women are maintained on mechanical ventilation. Physicians and
families have to decide how much effort and resources to expend to
try and preserve the fetus’ life.228 Two maternal brain death cases
227. See Stipulation of Facts, Muñoz v. John Peter Smith Hospital, No. 096-270080-14
(Tex. 96th Dist. Ct. Jan. 24, 2014), available at http://www.thaddeuspope.com/images/
MUNOZ_-_Stipulation_Facts.pdf (both parties agreed to the stipulation that the fetus was
not viable).
228. If public or pooled resources are used to preserve a fetus, answering how much
effort to undertake has even larger implications since more stakeholders have a say.
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from the early 1980s demonstrate the complications in deciding
whether to try to save the unborn child of a brain-dead mother and
how physicians somewhat opaquely take these challenges into ac-
count.229 In the first case, significant questions arose about “the
status of the fetus,” and the case was very complicated because the
mother was never formally declared brain dead.230 Life support was
terminated in this case.231 In the second case, the fetus was success-
fully carried to term.232 Given the relative obscurity around
decision-making in cases like these, physicians likely make explicit
or implicit judgments about when the medical prospects for a via-
ble fetus are not good enough to try to maintain a pregnant
woman233 and about what costs would be excessive.234 Physicians
should also be cautious about encouraging false hope in families
when a fetus might be too early in gestation to survive, and they
should clearly inform families about the likelihood that a fetus who
survives would suffer from serious morbidities.
C. Other Limits: Research with Brain-Dead Patients
The above Subsection suggests that the legal fiction of brain
death does not mechanically extend to new contexts; instead, each
extension of the fiction needs a legitimate purpose and must make
sense. Other situations may exist in which the legal fiction of brain
death may be useful. According to the scholarship on legal fictions,
extending a legal fiction beyond its original purposes must be done
cautiously since extension into new areas may not make sense. Le-
gal fictions allow existing law to cross boundaries relatively easily
and opaquely, and should, therefore, be used sparingly and with
clear boundaries. Through briefly touching on biomedical re-
search, an area where it may make sense to use the legal fiction of
brain death, this Subsection demonstrates how limiting the legal
fiction of brain death might work.235
229. Dillon WP et al., Life Support and Maternal Brain Death During Pregnancy, 248 J. AM.
MED. ASS’N 1089, 1089–90 (1982).
230. Id. at 1091.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Siegler & Wikler, supra note 132.
234. See Anstötz, supra note 191, at 342 (describing medical efforts doctors would not take
to preserve the life of the fetus).
235. See Pernick, supra note 59, at 10 (citing Henry K. Beecher, ETHICAL PROBLEMS CRE-
ATED BY THE HOPELESSLY UNCONSCIOUS PATIENT, 278 N. ENG. J. MED. 1427, 1430 (1966))
(noting that one of Henry Beecher’s motivations for supporting the concept of brain death
may have been to find an alternative and less ethically troublesome way of conducting medi-
cal research).
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Practically, research on brain-dead patients is different than re-
search with biologically-dead people (“cadavers”). Unlike research
with cadavers, conducting research with brain-dead individuals
could interfere with valuable organ donation. Considerable medi-
cal resources are required to maintained brain-dead patients, even
for research purposes. There are also important concerns about the
disrespectful treatment of individuals who are diagnosed as brain
dead, but who are not biologically dead. For example, consider a
study testing the effects of explosive land mines on brain-dead bod-
ies.236 This raises an intuitive reaction of concern or even disgust.
These considerations support avoiding the application of the legal
fiction of brain death in the research context and a need for more
contextual analysis of the specific research projects and the costs
they involve.
However, some research with brain-dead patients is easier to jus-
tify. One oncology researcher sought to test a method for targeting
cancer therapies to particular organs that carried uncertain risks
and would require multiple, invasive biopsies.237 These risks seemed
excessive for patients who still might have a meaningful recovery
from their cancer and could also take away time spent with their
loved ones. Meanwhile, the researcher contacted families of brain-
dead cancer patients who knew that their loved ones would have
wanted to participate in research that could help others.238 This re-
search does not raise concerns about reducing the supply of organs
available for transplantation to save the lives of others, because or-
gans from metastatic, end-stage cancer patients are not typically
used for transplantation based on worries that the organ recipient
might develop cancer.239 Individuals should be allowed to prospec-
tively consent to such research, since concerns about harm to the
brain dead patients are reduced.240 The families of brain-dead pa-
tients who did not express their wishes about research when they
were capable of making such a decision should be permitted to give
proxy consent for research on them.
236. Jim Ritter, Ethical Frontier, CHI. SUN-TIMES (2006) (noting that such research has
been conducted with cadavers).
237. Lila Guterman, Crossing the Line? 49 Chron. Higher Educ., no. 47, 2003, at A13.
238. See id.
239. See M.A. Nalesnik et al., Donor-Transmitted Malignancies in Organ Transplantation: As-
sessment of Clinical Risk, AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION, 1140, 1142–45 (2011).
240. See generally Miller & Truog, supra note 155.
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Several scholars have given considerable thought to research on
brain-dead patients and have published ethical guidelines for re-
search on people who are brain dead.241 The existing ethical
guidance  appears to rely on the legal fiction of brain death without
fully acknowledging it.242 Within existing guidelines, there are pro-
visions that seem to be motivated by concerns that are different
from the concerns about research on corpses. For instance, the
guidelines suggest a time limit on the research because “[t]he pros-
pect of prolonged storage of ventilated and perfused bodies for
research is deemed abhorrent to many and risks undermining pub-
lic support for research with the recently deceased.”243 In sum,
researchers should not use the legal fiction of brain death to deter-
mine when research is ethically permissible on brain-dead
individuals and instead should separately analyze how to apply the
legal and ethical principles governing research to brain-dead
participants.
IV. CONSIDERATIONS FOR CREATING AND USING LEGAL FICTIONS
In light of the previous discussion, how should judges and legisla-
tors determine when to apply the legal fiction of brain death? Are
there limits that would have helped in cases like McMath and
Muñoz? First, highlighting that brain death is a legal fiction is useful
because this alerts lawmakers to consider whether brain death is an
appropriate standard when they are creating a law that relies upon
legal standards for death. Once the legal fiction of brain death is
recognized, however, legal actors should not assume that brain
death applies by default to new laws that require a determination of
death. In drafting statutes that require the continued provision of
life-sustaining treatment for pregnant women, the legislature
should realize that the statute would, in some cases, require the
continued provision of care to brain-dead women whose fetuses are
not viable. Then, the legislature should determine whether the stat-
ute simply should apply to viable fetuses.
Even in cases that involve viable fetuses, questions remain as to
whether a statute that requires life-sustaining treatment for preg-
nant, brain-dead women, such as in Texas, is constitutional. Cases
241. See Rebecca D. Pentz et al., Ethics Guidelines for Research with the Recently Dead, 11 NAT.
MED. 1145, 1146 (2005) (Table 1) (comparing existing guidelines for research involving the
dead—each column of the table cites a different guideline).
242. Id. at Table 1.
243. Id. at 1148.
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involving brain-dead pregnant women require a complicated bal-
ancing of the mother’s rights against the state’s interests, which
includes weighing a woman’s autonomy and privacy rights and the
state’s interest in preserving the fetus’ life and, to a much lesser
extent, the life of a pregnant woman who is not biologically dead.
Thus, removing the legal fiction reveals that the Texas statute is
constitutionally suspect even for cases involving pregnant women
who are not brain dead. Although this is a bolder approach, it is
easier for courts to justify and more likely to set the right precedent
for future cases. Simply defaulting to the brain death legal standard
short-circuits this important, if complicated, analysis.244
More generally, the previous analysis suggests that status legal fic-
tions have clear and valuable uses, but that they can also extend
beyond reasonable limits. Courts should not adopt a fiction that is
likely to spread inappropriately. For instance, Louise Harmon ar-
gues that, in its initial case, the fiction of substituted judgment fairly
distributed money from a well-off uncle to a needy niece.245 Yet in
future cases, courts used this same legal fiction to justify sterilizing
incompetent adults.246 Harmon is concerned that all legal fictions
may eventually be stretched beyond their initial purposes and cause
harm, and that it is difficult to predict how this will happen.247
Thus, she recommends a healthy suspicion towards legal fictions.248
Harmon does not fully acknowledge, however, that some of the le-
gal fiction’s unforeseeable future uses were appropriate and
perhaps even beneficial. For instance, using the legal fiction of sub-
stituted judgment in the Cruzan case led the Court to require clear
and convincing evidence for a family to withdraw life-support,249 im-
plicitly recognize the right to withdraw life-sustaining therapy,250
and possibly provide room for the law to grow.
Thus, merely identifying harms a fiction causes is not sufficient
to condemn its creation or use. Courts should consider both its val-
uable and harmful uses when they determine whether to create a
legal fiction in the first place. Moreover, sometimes it is clear that
244. The court was possibly interested in a pragmatic and fast solution that was unlikely
to be appealed and might have thought that a statutory analysis would be harder to chal-
lenge. It is difficult to fault the judge in this case but important to note that a different
approach could have reached the same outcome and might have set a better precedent.
245. Harmon, supra note 107, at 20–21.
246. Id. at 27–33.
247. See Harmon, supra note 107, at 60–63.
248. See id. at 70.
249. Id.
250. Kenneth P. Miller, Defining Rights in the States: Judicial Activism and Popular Response,
76 ALA. L. REV. 2061, 2103 n.44 (“The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized a federal constitu-
tional right for persons to refuse life-sustaining treatment.”).
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the court needs to use a legal fiction to avoid considerable injustice,
and that using that particular legal fiction should be discretionary.
If the court can anticipate that the legal fiction might create signifi-
cant future harms, the author of the fiction should construct it as
narrowly as possible.
Predicting the future use of a legal fiction is difficult and
stretches beyond the domain of medicine. Medical technology, with
its large potential for future development, is just one example of a
regime that is difficult to regulate. Another area of rapidly chang-
ing jurisprudence is determining which campaign contributions the
legislature may prohibit or regulate as speech. Courts should only
create legal fictions when the court can delineate the fiction’s limits
in advance and when the fiction’s value is significant enough to risk
overextension.
Measuring the value of a legal fiction is also a difficult task and is
different for judges and legislators. Legal actors have different avail-
able alternatives. Judges generally lack authority to create new legal
rules out of whole cloth and are bound by precedent. Legal fictions
expand the judges’ boundaries in a way that is potentially danger-
ous. Yet, judges may appropriately create legal fictions where
applying the rule seems patently unjust. On the other hand, legisla-
tors typically have more discretion to create new rules and are
mainly constrained by public perception of the rules. Because legis-
lators have greater authority for rulemaking than judges, they
should rarely create or rely on legal fictions.
Those who create legal fictions should seek to limit future expan-
sion. Whenever a legal fiction is created and each time it is
extended, the court or legislature should state the fiction’s purpose
and build limits directly into it. Then, it would be harder for a fu-
ture court to improperly extend the legal fiction, since the
constraints are already in place. For most legal fictions, however, no
such process has happened, and judges can easily extend the fic-
tion. Good reasons support making legal fictions more difficult to
develop. Legal fictions are very costly to create, given the damage
they can cause, and the authors of legal fictions are not sufficiently
sensitive to the costs of their creations. Because legal fictions are
relatively easy to create and extend, resisting them is more difficult
than it should be, given their potential for abuse. Various legal ac-
tors should recognize the dangers of legal fictions and provide
more careful and clear descriptions the legal fiction’s created in-
tent, which will hopefully lead to the more cautious and judicious
use of legal fictions.
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CONCLUSION
The McMath and Muñoz cases illustrate how the lack of trans-
parency around the legal fiction of brain death has developed to
where the fiction has become overused. Although many scholars
have written about different types of legal fictions and the historical
basis for them, they have not discussed what happens to legal fic-
tions over time and what characterizes legal fictions that are likely
to be misused and overextended. Unacknowledged legal fictions
are especially under-recognized and under-studied. Additionally,
scholars have not explored what impact the lack of transparency
concerning legal fictions has in areas such as public trust or collec-
tive action. In this vein, it is unsurprising that courts use legal
fictions to determine death, an area fraught with controversy. The
legal governance of medical advances is difficult since legal actors
must work with medical and scientific experts to understand new
medical technologies and how best to regulate them. In some cases,
courts may even unwittingly create legal fictions because they fail to
understand the implications of new technology. The development
of the legal fiction of brain death may serve as a valuable illustration
of the useful and pernicious aspects of a legal fiction.
Future scholarship should explore the development of legal fic-
tions and their trajectories over time. Scholars should work to
understand when legal fictions likely arise and determine when le-
gal fictions are dangerous enough to diminish or even negate their
value. It would also be interesting to study whether legal fictions
largely created outside of the legal profession (such as the legal fic-
tion of brain death) have less legitimacy than those fictions judges
and legislators construct. Legal fictions are not a historical remnant
of the law; they are a legal tool that courts and legislatures are un-
likely to abandon. Future scholarship should recognize this,
develop a richer understanding of legal fictions, and provide gui-
dance on how legal actors should craft limits on legal fictions.
